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ABSTRACT
Bus service reliability has always been a top concern for transit agencies and their
customers. Unfortunately, there are several factors detrimental to reliable bus service.
Outside influences such as weather, traffic, and road construction can wreak havoc on
even the best laid plans. Internally, poor planning, insufficient maintenance, and
differing operator abilities can work to undermine bus service reliability.
To help counteract these problems, transit agencies typically deploy a team of supervisors
who are responsible for monitoring, maintaining, and restoring reliable service. To do
their job effectively, supervisors require high levels of operational information and a
reliable communications system. These resources, however, can vary in their availability
and may not be at ideal levels. This research proposes a framework to aid in the planning
of bus supervision deployment given different levels of information, communications,
and personnel.
The primary focus of the framework is the deployment of post, mobile, and control center
supervisors given an agency's current level of information and communication resources.
The application of the framework begins with a service reliability and supervision
resource assessment. Based on these assessments, a system level personnel deployment
strategy is developed and then evaluated.
Two case studies - the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) Route 20 and the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Silver Line - are presented as applications of the
proposed framework. Findings suggest that personnel deployment at both agencies is
suboptimal: both agencies deploy too many post supervisors given current resource
levels, and for the CTA, too few mobile supervisors. Findings also suggest that putting
increased information and communication resources in place should lead agencies to
have post supervisors only at the busiest most critical locations, mobile supervisors for
incident response and reallocate many field-based supervisors to the control center for
headway and schedule management.
Thesis Supervisor: Nigel H.M. Wilson, Ph.D.
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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1 Introduction
This research reviews current bus service supervision practices and develops a
framework for transit agencies to aid in bus supervision deployment planning. The
framework suggests how transit agencies should deploy their bus supervisors in order to
maximize bus service reliability. Taken into account are the number of supervisors
available, the communications structure in place, and the amount of information available
to the supervisors.
1.1 Motivation
For transit agencies that try and provide quality customer service, bus service reliability is
one of their top priorities. Not only do customers want safe, fast, and affordable transit,
they also want to be able to count on it time and time again. Wait times should be
predictable, and travel times should be consistent. Any deviations and customers will
expect to be informed.
Unfortunately, there are several factors detrimental to reliable bus service. Outside
influences such as weather, traffic, and road construction can wreak havoc on even the
best laid plans. Internally, poor planning, insufficient maintenance, and differing
operator abilities can work to undermine bus service reliability.
To counteract these factors, transit agencies typically deploy field supervisors in
conjunction with establishing a control center as part of a bus service management
program. The supervisors and the control center are then empowered to make real-time
operating decisions regarding the buses on the street. Field supervisors can assist
operators with defective equipment for example, or provide them instruction in order to
restore "normal" bus service.
1.1.1 Prior Research Knowledge
The topic of bus supervision and bus service reliability has been studied extensively prior
to this thesis. Much of this research has been conducted in the areas of transit service
reliability, operations control, and bus supervision. This research has shown that there
are many causes of unreliability, both external and internal to the transit agency, and that
service unreliability plays a large part in the transit user's experience. Several operations
control methods such as holding, and expressing vehicles have been explored, and their
theoretical benefits to reliability are well documented. Regarding bus supervision,
studies have been completed suggesting the benefits of centralized control and
technology in improving the effectiveness of supervision on service reliability.
Until now, most of the prior research has been theoretical both in approach and in
findings. Operations control strategies have been modeled to show that selectively
holding buses to either schedule or headway can produce net benefits for passengers by
lowering their expected waiting times. Bus supervision findings have claimed that
centralized operations control combined with advanced information and communications
technologies will improve bus service reliability. This thesis will attempt to go a step
further by applying these operations control and supervision strategies to two bus routes
at the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA) in order to find out how effective they can be, and to uncover both the
potential and the limitations of bus supervision.
1.1.2 The Supervision Challenge
In the past, a lack of technology has hampered the efforts of bus supervisors in
maintaining reliable bus service. Supervisors in the field and in the control center have
typically not had access to real-time information on their bus network. Information such
as bus locations, passenger loads, and incident locations would have to be ascertained
manually, and this would lead to slow and ineffective responses to service reliability
problems. Communication constraints further inhibited supervisory effectiveness by
slowing the information sharing process and restricting available responses.
In addition to a lack of technology, supervisors are often given a myriad of tasks to
complete. While these tasks, such as conducting onsite repairs, managing crew changes
(reliefs), or providing customer service do contribute to restoring service reliability, they
detract from the supervisor's ability to maintain reliability through schedule adjustments
and utilizing other operations control strategies.
1.1.3 Role of Technology
Recently, emerging technologies have been at the forefront of transit research.
Automatic data collection in the form of vehicle location information (AVL) and
passenger counting information (APC) has given researchers the ability to examine
vehicle movement behavior and passenger travel behavior. In addition, new real-time
AVL information systems and digital communications are giving bus supervisors the
resources necessary to detect service reliability problems earlier and tackle them more
effectively.
In this thesis, the emerging technologies serve dual roles in the evaluation of bus
supervision. Information and communications technologies are used to maximize the
potential of bus supervisors while automatically collected vehicle location and passenger
information is used to evaluate the benefits of bus supervision on service reliability.
1.2 Objectives of the Research
Utilizing the emerging transit technologies, and building from the prior research, this
research will propose a framework to aid in the planning of bus supervision for improved
bus service reliability. The framework will then be applied to the CTA Route 20 and the
MBTA Silver Line.
By applying the framework, this thesis will examine the role of field supervisors and the
control center with regard to service reliability. The tasks assigned to each party, the
decision making process, and the personnel assignments will be explored. In addition,
the question of personnel requirements will be addressed given a certain level of
information and communications technology.
1.3 Methodology and Approach
In order to carefully examine bus service supervision, the researcher must have first hand
knowledge and experience of practice. Towards this end, field observations and
discussions with key personnel at the CTA, the MBTA, and TriMet (Portland, OR) were
conducted. This led to a working knowledge of the daily operations of bus service
supervision at each of these agencies.
The state of the practice at the CTA and MBTA is analyzed to find out how bus
supervisors are deployed and why. The drawbacks and potential benefits of each strategy
are outlined and lessons are drawn from each one. From these lessons, a framework is
developed in order to improve deployment strategies and ultimately, bus service
reliability.
This framework is then applied to two case studies involving the CTA's Route 20 and to
the MBTA's Silver Line. These routes were chosen due to their technological
innovations and research potential. At the CTA, a project is currently being piloted that
will provide real-time AVL information at the control center, in effect giving a dispatcher
real-time knowledge of bus locations and schedule adherence status for Route 20. At the
MBTA, the Washington Street Silver Line bus route is already equipped with this
technology but it is not officially being used for operations control. By selecting Route
20 and the Silver Line, the framework application will be able to evaluate the full
potential of bus supervision given these optimal operating conditions.
Applying the framework is a five step process. First, field observations and automated
data are collected on each route to learn about ridership characteristics, current levels of
service reliability, and available resources. This information is then used to develop a
supervision deployment strategy for the route in question. Once the strategy has been
formulated, a model is used to predict the potential benefits and costs of the strategy to
the agency and its customers. Finally, if the net benefits are positive, the supervision
strategy is deployed to verify the model results or for the long run. Data is collected and
analyzed once again to measure the actual benefits and costs. As part of this thesis
research a one-week experiment of a different supervision strategy was conducted on
CTA Route 20).
From the extensive field work and case study applications, conclusions will be drawn
regarding the effectiveness of the proposed bus supervision strategies. General
conclusions will also be drawn with regard to how differing resource levels govern the
way a transit agency deploys its bus service supervision team in order to best improve
bus service reliability.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The next chapter will set the stage for the rest of the thesis by introducing the general
concepts underlying bus service reliability. This includes defining bus service
management, supervision, operations, and planning as they relate to service reliability.
The concept of service reliability itself will also be laid out so the reader can better
understand the goals of this research. A literature review is presented to put this thesis's
research in the context of prior findings. This includes research into transit service
reliability, operations control, bus supervision, and a documented case study in
supervision at TriMet.
The proposed bus supervision evaluation framework is presented in chapter 3. The
purpose of the framework is explained, and the steps in applying the framework are
reviewed in detail. In addition, the expected outcomes of the framework application are
described at the end of the chapter.
The fourth chapter presents the CTA case study. An overview of the current supervision
situation is presented first. Following that, a description of Route 20 will be given, and
then a summary of the field work and data analysis as part of the problem identification
process. The proposed supervision strategy to counteract the identified problems will
then be presented along with the simulation results. Finally, a field experiment involving
the CTA's own Real-Time Computer Aided Dispatch and Automatic Vehicle Location
pilot project will be described. This pilot will operate as the CTA's first foray into real
time AVL control for its bus system and allows the research to test the capabilities of the
pilot in aiding bus supervisors during the experiment.
The fifth chapter presents the MBTA case study and how the research approach has been
applied to the Washington Street Silver Line. A quick overview of the Silver Line will
first be presented, followed by a summary of the field work and data analysis as part of
the problem identification process. The proposed supervision strategy to counteract the
identified problems will then be presented along with the simulation results.
Key findings and conclusions from the case studies and state of the practice reviews will
be summarized in the sixth chapter. This leads to recommendations for the CTA
regarding their supervision strategies, and deployment in the immediate as well as the not
too distant future. Finally, a summary of conclusions will be presented. Newly raised
questions and those left unanswered will be posed pointing the way to future research in
this area.
2 Background
This chapter will first provide a literature review of the prior research concerning
operations control and bus supervision. This will serve to put this research in the context
of what has already been examined and how the prior research sets up the research
presented here.
This chapter will then define the concept of bus service reliability as it pertains to the
research. Issues affecting reliability will be discussed and explored to give the reader a
sense of the current situation facing bus operations. Bus service management, the
operations division that deals specifically with maintaining and improving service
reliability, will then be described in detail.
2.1 Literature Review
Many studies have been conducted in the field of transit service reliability, operations
control strategies, and bus supervision. Presented in this literature review will be the key
findings of the prior research and how this research will build upon them.
2.1.1 Transit Service Reliability
Abkowitz et al. (1978) conducted a comprehensive study of transit service reliability,
focused on the impacts of reliability on transit agencies and their customers. It identified
possible causes of unreliability, methods to measure reliability, and strategies that could
be employed to improve reliability.
Impacts of Transit Reliability
In reviewing prior studies concerning the relationship between travel behavior and transit
service reliability, the authors note how improvements in reliability can have positive
effects on the utility of transit relative to other transportation modes. Reducing travel
time and especially wait time variability through reliability improvements can increase
the frequency of transit use and can also attract new riders.
From the transit agency perspective, Abkowitz et al. (1978) discusses how reliability
improvements can reduce capital and operating costs. This is achieved by reducing travel
time variability which in turn can reduce the need for excess resources assigned to a
route. Revenue increases are also possible as a result of reliability improvements leading
to increases in ridership.
Causes of Unreliability
According to the study, unreliability factors can be classified as either environmental or
inherent. Later in this chapter Table 2-4 in section 2.2.3 summarizes most of these
factors and then goes on to describe them in detail. In general, traffic and demand
variability are noted to be significant causes of unreliability. Traffic signals and traffic
flow patterns contribute to travel time variability while variations in demand can cause
variable dwell times as well as total travel times.
The study goes on to state that initial deviations from the timetable, either at the terminal
or mid-route will propagate downstream. These propagations tend to create unbalanced
passenger loads and contribute to further unreliability downstream.
Measuring Unreliability
Abkowitz et al. (1978) reviewed prior research into measuring transit service unreliability
and described several weaknesses with these measures. The authors found that many of
the measures did not capture unreliability from the perspective of the passenger.
Measures were tied to schedule adherence so ineffective schedules could cause biased
measures. Finally, data collection methods failed to account for time-of-day and seasonal
variations in demand and in the operating environment.
After reviewing prior studies, the authors developed a set of measures that would address
these weaknesses. These measures could help identify reliability problems and assist in
selecting strategies that could improve reliability.
The measures suggested by the authors involve finding the mean, and coefficient of
variation of the following service attributes:
* Travel time distribution
* Schedule adherence
* Headway distribution
Seasonality and time of day variations should be controlled for when making
comparisons.
Improving reliability
Several methods are outlined in the study for improving service reliability. The methods
were classified as priority, control, or operational strategies.
Priority strategies generally involve infrastructure changes such as a dedicated travel lane
or signal priority. The authors cite prior studies that indicate that priority strategies can
reduce mean travel times by mitigating the environmental influences on reliability.
Control strategies are employed in real-time to improve reliability. These strategies,
which will be described in detail in section 2.3.1, typically involve holding or expressing
buses in one fashion or another in order to restore service reliability. One of the major
components in utilizing control strategies is the need to monitor service. Service
monitoring, including information, communication, and personnel requirements, is
described in section 2.3.2
In addition to corrective control strategies, the study describes how operational strategies
can improve reliability through prevention. Schedule improvements can reduce the risk
of service unreliability by giving operators sufficient time to complete trips and begin
their following trips on time. Likewise, improvements in fleet and labor management can
reduce the risk of unreliability by lessening the chance of a run being held-in or a bus
breaking down mid-trip.
Future research suggestions
The study by Abkowitz et al. (1978) suggests many points for future research. Relevant
to this thesis are studies testing the suggested control strategies and evaluating their
effects. This thesis will cover both of these areas in detail.
2.1.2 Analysis of Transit Service Reliability
With the advent of automatic data collection, the methods to analyze transit service
reliability have become much more powerful. Large databases that archive automatic
vehicle location (AVL) and automatic passenger counter (APC) data now allow research
to tap into a wealth of data in analyzing transit service reliability. However, even with
large amounts of data available, a process to utilize this data must be clearly defined to be
able to conduct a meaningful analysis.
Cham (2006) developed a framework detailing the application of automatic data
collection to the analysis of service reliability. This framework first outlines relevant
metrics to measure the state of unreliability. Second, the framework uses these metrics to
identify the causes of unreliability, and then finally, proposes possible corrections to
improve service reliability. Cham applies this framework to the MBTA's Silver Line.
Cham, after citing Abkowitz et al. (1978), identified three major measurements that can
be used to capture service reliability conditions:
* Schedule adherence
* Headway adherence (regularity)
* Running time distribution
Due to the automatic data collection available on the MBTA Silver Line, Cham was able
to apply these measures over a 3 week period in September, 2004. The main finding was
that the Silver Line suffered large headway variations leading to bus bunching and
headway gaps in turn leading to excess waiting time for passengers. Variable running
times throughout the day, especially along portions of the route where buses did not have
preferential lanes, were shown to be partially responsible for uneven headways. The
main cause of unreliability however was found to be at the terminals where departure
headways were quite irregular. Cham's analysis demonstrated a clear correlation
between terminal departures and downstream performance. Those trips that left the
terminal with the scheduled headway had a much greater chance of keeping that headway
downstream than trips that left either bunched or gapped.
With her analysis showing irregular terminal departures and running time variability as
the main causes of unreliability, Cham concludes that a combination of improved
terminal supervision, conditional signal priority, and a higher level of priority on the right
of way would help to improve service reliability on the Silver Line.
By using the large amount of automatically collected data available, Cham was able to
develop a framework that measured service unreliability, identified probable causes of
unreliability, and suggested changes that could improve reliability. This thesis will build
on Cham's work by extending this framework and applying it to the CTA's Route 20, and
then examining the effectiveness of supervision in improving reliability for both Route 20
and the Silver Line.
2.1.3 Operations Control
Much research has been conducted on the topic of operations control strategies. As
described in the previous section, operations control strategies are a set of corrective
actions that are utilized in real time in order to restore and maintain service reliability.
Holding
Turnquist (1981) examines vehicle holding strategies that can improve transit service
reliability. In this study, schedule-based holding for low frequency routes and headway-
based holding for high frequency routes are treated as two different cases. Turnquist
notes that on low frequency routes, schedule adherence is very important because most
passengers attempt to arrive at their bus stops shortly before the scheduled arrival of the
bus. On high frequency routes, passengers generally arrive randomly without regard to
the schedule and therefore headway regularity is most important.
With regard to headway-based holding, Turnquist cites Welding (1957) for the following
widely used average waiting time equation:
E(W) = h [I + cov 2 (h) (2.1)
2
where E(W) is the expected wait time, h is the expected headway, and cov(h) is the
coefficient of variation of headway. By regulating headways through holding, the
variability of headways can be reduced leading to lower average waiting times.
Two types of headway-based holding are identified by Turnquist (1981): Single-headway
holding and "Prefol" holding. The single-headway strategy requires only the knowledge
of the headway of the vehicle to be held. If the headway is short, the vehicle is held to a
minimum headway at the control point. Turnquist notes that this strategy is most
effective when headways are strongly correlated. In other words, single-headway
holding works best when bus bunching exists with short headways followed by large
headways. By holding the second bus, the bunch will be broken up and the following
long headway will be reduced, thus reducing headway variability more than if the bus
bunch consisted of three (or more) buses.
The Prefol strategy is thus named because it holds buses to split headway differences
between the preceding headway and the following headway for each vehicle. Note that
this strategy requires information on the following headway of a bus, information that
traditionally has not been readily available. Turnquist (1981) notes that the Prefol
strategy is more effective in regulating headways than the single-headway strategy but
loses its advantage as headways become more strongly correlated.
Control Point Location
In another study, Turnquist and Blume (1980) discuss the importance of the control point
location for headway-based holding. They also discuss the implications of holding when
headways are perfectly correlated and when they are statistically independent of each
other.
Turnquist and Blume state that "it is wise to control a route at a point where relatively
few people are on the vehicle and relatively many are waiting to board at subsequent
stops" in order to maximize total benefits. This means that for most routes, the control
point should be as close to the departure terminal as possible. Headway variation will be
lowest just past the control point but will tend to increase further downstream.
With regard to headway correlation, Turnquist and Blume show that holding to a
minimum headway is more beneficial if short headways are always followed by long
headways, than if headways are independent of each other. When headways are
independent, this single-headway holding strategy becomes less effective because a short
headway does not necessarily imply a large following headway. This conclusion has
strong implications for this research. Now that transit agencies such as the CTA are
starting to have real-time vehicle location information, selective holding strategies can be
employed where only those vehicles with long following headways are held. Real-time
vehicle location information allows the Prefol strategy described earlier to be utilized.
The case studies in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis will describe the use and benefits of this
strategy in detail.
2.1.4 Bus Supervision
Levinson (1991) completed a comprehensive synthesis of bus supervision practices at 20
U.S. and Canadian transit systems. This synthesis surveyed existing supervisory
practices, identified impediments to transit service reliability and bus supervision, and
suggests ways to overcome these impediments. Key factors that contribute to reliable bus
service are identified. Levinson also goes on to describe the role of technology in bus
supervision and control.
Key Factors for Reliable Bus Service
Levinson (1991) identifies four main factors that contribute to reliable bus service:
* Realistic routes and schedules
* Adequate maintenance
* Sound personnel policy
* Effective supervision
Schedules must be realistic if operators are to be able to adhere to them. Schedules that
are too fast or too slow will result in poor adherence and possibly bus bunching and
uneven passenger loads. Route structures must also be realistic for operators to adhere to
the schedule. Routes that are too long or heavily congested will compromise schedule
adherence.
Maintenance of vehicles and other equipment is important in order to maximize the mean
distance between failures. It is also important to be able to maximize the number of
buses that can be deployed on any given day. As will be discussed in section 2.2, poor
maintenance can lead to runs being held-in and buses breaking down on the street causing
severe service reliability problems.
As Levinson notes, sound personnel policies are important to keep absenteeism down and
morale high among operators, supervisors, and other transit personnel. By encouraging
team building efforts and promoting a "people serving people" concept, transit agencies
will be in a better position to provide reliable bus service.
Once realistic schedules and routes are in place, maintenance is taken care of, and
personnel policies are fine tuned, supervision will have a greater chance of being
effective in keeping bus service reliable. Levinson finds that for supervisors to be most
effective, "prompt and informed decisions must be made when emergencies or service
problems occur. A fast exchange of information is essential to reduce response times.
Communication and information technology provide the means for this rapid
communication" (Levinson, 1991).
Impediments to Supervision
In the survey of transit systems, Levinson (1991) identified several impediments to
supervision as reported by the transit agencies. Most often cited as a problem was the
lack of financial resources. More specifically, the lack of resources led to maintenance
problems, and absenteeism, complicating the task for supervisors in the field. Some
transit systems reported that too many of their routes were either too long or poorly
scheduled, leading to reliability problems and the inability to supervise these routes
effectively.
Poor equipment maintenance was reported to take an extra toll on reliability. Not only
did equipment such as fare boxes, mirrors, or the vehicle itself break down, but
supervisors had to take care of these problems in the field, diverting them from their
primary task of maintaining service reliability.
Financial resource constraints affected the supervision staff as well. Inadequate
communications was cited as inhibiting supervisors from responding in a timely manner
and taking appropriate actions. The inability to have information on the entire route or
network in real-time also hampered supervision efforts. Finally, several transit agencies
cited a lack of personnel as an impediment to service reliability.
Technology and Management as Methods to Improve Supervision
The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) (now known as LAMTA) as
surveyed by Levinson (1991) cites several methods that could improve supervision:
* Schedule fast travel times and give operators more recovery time.
* Break long lines (routes) into segments to avoid accumulating headway problems.
* Minimize diversion of supervisors to other activities. Supervisors should focus on
establishing detours, adjusting schedules, and replacing breakdowns.
* Improve management and "team building" to reduce absenteeism and excessive
overtime due to "no shows".
These suggestions address the main factors influencing reliability by reducing
maintenance efforts by supervisors, improving personnel policies, and creating realistic
schedules and routes.
In addition to improving on current practices, transit agencies are also looking to
technology to help improve bus service reliability. Levinson (1991) cites automatic
vehicle location (AVL) and automatic passenger counting (APC) systems that can be of
aid to transit agencies and their supervisors.
The Ottawa-Carleton Regional Transit Commission (OC Transpo) experience with APC
is documented by Levinson. After being installed in 1975, OC Transpo was able to
utilize the new APC system to log and archive vehicle and passenger movements. This
then gave OC Transpo the ability to produce reports on all of its APC equipped vehicles
and analyze its routes looking for reliability, or other operational problems. Levinson
states that APC systems are useful to support planning and for monitoring system
performance. Recurring reliability problems can be identified and corrective actions can
be taken to alleviate them.
With regard to AVL systems, Levinson examined the Toronto Transit Commission and
their use of real-time AVL. Vehicles network wide communicated with inspectors at one
of ten divisional control centers. The radio communications system allowed vehicles to
be polled on their location about every 10 seconds. With this kind of monitoring,
inspectors were able to correct scheduling and vehicle location problems by
communicating directly with the operators via radio. The inspectors were also able to
communicate with passengers to resolve fare disputes for example, or listen in on the
vehicle to resolve emergencies. (This system however has since been retired due to its
lack of effectiveness).
Summary
Levinson's (1991) synthesis provided a comprehensive look at the practice of bus
supervision, impediments facing supervisors and service reliability, and methods and
technologies that can address these impediments. This thesis will build on Levinson's
work by examining how technology and management methods can improve service
reliability at the CTA and MBTA but will also examine how deployment strategies of
supervisory staff contribute to effective service management and improved reliability.
2.1.5 Communications and Information for Bus Supervision
Barker (2002) studied the Chicago Transit Authority's communication and information
sharing infrastructure. Barker focused on evaluating how communications constraints
affect the availability of information to service managers and eventually bus service
reliability.
Barker's main findings demonstrated how the CTA's current radio system lacks the
capacity and structure to be able to effectively manage small delays before they become
big ones. He notes that "a delay cannot be addressed until it becomes a significant
problem" due to the fact that small delays are never reported over the air. Only when
delays exceed 10 minutes do they become candidates for being broadcast but his study
shows that this can take up to another 15 minutes to report over the air, rendering the
information almost useless to supervisors. Barker goes on to note that the lack of radio
capacity inhibits field supervisors from sharing their own knowledge of delays on the
route with central control or their peers on the street, further limiting the amount of
information supervisors have. The conclusion Barker draws is that often the best option
that supervisors end up having is to do nothing when faced with a service gap. This lack
of action has the benefit of having "the least appealing worst-case scenario", which is the
situation remaining as-is. Supervisors acting on a service gap with no information on
what actions other supervisors may be taking or where other buses are, risk making the
situation much worse. For example, if a supervisor expresses a bus expecting a follower
close behind but the follower was short turned by a supervisor upstream, then collectively
the situation is now far worse than either supervisor could have predicted (Barker, 2002).
2.1.6 Pre-planning for Service Disruptions
Moore (2002) conducted a study to develop a process to improve transit service
management during disruptions. The study focused on the pre-planning necessary for
service management to be able to respond effectively to disruptions.
Moore finds that pre-planning for disruptions gives transit agencies access to the ideal
responses. Static information, such as the load profile or operations plan allows service
managers the ability to pick out the best disruption response given a set of pre-defined
options. Dynamic information such as the current loading conditions and bus locations
further enhances the decision making process.
Communications and information gaps are shown in the study to be factors limiting
service disruption response. Communication constraints were found to slow down the
information sharing process, leading to slow responses to disruptions. This resulted in
fewer service restoration options being available due to the delayed response, and greater
negative passenger impacts.
2.1.7 Simulation for the Evaluation of Control Strategies
Much of the prior research has evaluated operation control strategies through the use of
theoretical models, or experiments that have utilized manually collected data. Moses
(2005) attempted to evaluate these strategies through the development and application of
a simulation model. Inputs included automatic vehicle location (AVL) data and
automatic passenger counter (APC) data. This simulation model, created in MATLAB,
was designed to recreate observed operating conditions from the input data, and then
predict the effects of various operations control strategies.
Unfortunately, Moses was unable to validate the model against real operating conditions.
Simulated headway variances and travel time variances were statistically significantly
different than the observed conditions at multiple timepoints. This was attributed to
complex interactions between vehicle travel times, dwell times, and human behavior that
have not yet been modeled successfully. The Ashland route characteristics - a long, high
frequency route - were also cited as creating a "worst case" in terms of the difficulty of
the simulator replicating actual conditions.
This thesis will attempt to use the simulation approach Moses described to evaluate the
effectiveness of supervision and operations control. The simulator will focus on only one
hour, and one direction of the route however in order to minimize the complexity Moses
found to be difficult to model.
2.1.8 Operations Control and Bus Supervision: Tri-Met Case Study
Tri-Met, the transit provider in the Portland, Oregon metropolitan area has recently
implemented an automated Bus Dispatching System (BDS). This system incorporates
AVL and APC technology combined with real-time schedule adherence information that
is communicated to the operator and dispatchers.
Strathman et al. (2001) conducted a study utilizing the BDS system in an attempt to
improve reliability on a number of routes leaving downtown Portland during the PM peak
hour. This study involved one dispatcher monitoring these routes during their inbound
trip for schedule adherence. If the dispatcher anticipated that a run would be late on its
outbound trip, a field supervisor was notified so that Turnquist's (1982) "Prefol" holding
strategy could be implemented. Other available operations control strategies included
short turning and "switching" where the dispatcher would substitute a tripper run for a
regular service bus, or vice versa, in order to maintain headway regularity.
The results of the study showed that headway variances declined 3.8% overall and 15.8%
at the control point. Neither decline however was found to be statistically significant at
the 0.05 level. Headway variance was found to be lowest at the control point and
increased at every timepoint downstream. Most striking was that the effects of headway
control at the terminal were concentrated at the first three timepoints.
Although the study's effects on headways were mixed, passenger load variance was
shown to decrease by 16%. The authors attribute this to the more regular departure
headways and conclude that their analysis "indicates that small improvements in service
regularity can potentially generate more substantial improvements in passenger load
maintenance."
2.1.9 Summary of Literature Review
This literature review has shown that there has been a great a deal of research into the
topics of transit service reliability, operations control strategies, and bus supervision.
Abkowitz et al. (1978) documented several of the environmental and inherent causes of
unreliability, methods to measure unreliability, and the impacts of reliability on traveler
behavior.
Turnquist (1981) presented an analysis indicating the benefits of headway-based holding
for high frequency routes on service reliability. An important conclusion that ties into
this thesis relates to the "Prefol" strategy of holding buses to even out headways. This
strategy requires information on the following headway - information that usually
requires a real-time AVL system. The strategy however can be more effective than a
single-headway holding strategy which only requires information on the preceding
headway.
Turnquist and Blume (1980) demonstrated the effects of the control point location on the
benefits of headway-based holding. The authors found that it is important to locate the
control point as early as possible on the route. This way, many passengers who are
waiting to board downstream will benefit while few passengers will be on board the held
bus and inconvenienced.
Levinson (1991) surveyed several North American transit agencies about their
supervision practices. The author finds that there are four main inherent factors that
contribute to service reliability: realistic routes and schedules, adequate maintenance,
sound personnel policies, and effective supervision. For supervisors to be effective,
Levinson notes that they need an efficient communications system that allows a fast
exchange of information for timely and appropriate responses to service disruptions.
Technologies such as real-time AVL and APC systems are cited as possible solutions.
This thesis will build from this prior research by attempting to define more effective bus
supervision deployment strategies for the CTA given their evolving real-time AVL
system and existing personnel and communications capabilities. The operations control
strategies described by Turnquist and Blume will be applied in chapters 4 and 5 to
examine their effectiveness on service reliability. Their supervisory resource
requirements in terms of communications, information, and personnel will also be
examined.
The next section will describe the key aspects of bus service reliability from planning to
operations. The following section will then review the role of bus service management,
the operations control toolbox, and the resources necessary for supervisors to be most
effective.
2.2 Bus Service Reliability
At the core of bus service reliability is the notion of how customers and transit agencies
perceive service delivery. Customers want to be able to count on transit service time and
time again. They want predictable wait times as well as travel times that are consistent
from day to day. Transit agencies also want the same thing for their customers. More
reliable service means customers are being offered higher service quality, and agency
resources are being utilized more effectively.
As long as service delivery perceptions fall in line with expectations, transit agencies and
their customers can agree that bus service is reliable. If service expectations are not
being met, then service could be classified as being unreliable. Headways may be uneven
- leading to unpredictable waiting times - or travel times may be inconsistent. When
trying to maximize the benefits of public transportation, it is clear that making service
reliability an underlying goal is in the best interest of transit agencies and their customers.
To help identify shortcomings in service reliability, transit agencies need to define their
own internal metrics that will reflect service conditions. These metrics can then be used
to highlight the most pressing improvements needed, such as correcting late terminal
departures or decreasing operator absenteeism, as well as the methods that can be used to
address them.
In order to achieve reliable bus service, transit agencies must first begin planning for it
well in advance of their buses actually operating on the streets. This process, as shown in
Figure 2-1, requires a coordinated effort from many departments within a transit agency.
Service planners and schedulers need to develop operating plans with realistic
frequencies and running times that meet their customer's expectations. Resource
planners, service planners, and garages will have to communicate effectively so that
enough buses are in the fleet to meet service demands. At the garage level, fleet
maintenance is essential to keeping the fleet operable and street ready. Garages have the
added responsibility of making sure that there are enough operators to fill the service
demands prescribed by the planners. Should all of these requirements be met, bus service
will be in an ideal position to achieve maximum reliability on the street. Bus supervisors
can then focus on real-time issues such as traffic, weather, and accidents to maintain
service reliability.
Unfortunately, bus operations departments in the real world do not have the luxury of
being perfectly set up to run reliable service. Budget realities limit the resources
available to planners and garage managers meaning that they must prioritize resource
allocation to gain the maximum service reliability benefits. In the following subsections,
the planning process as it pertains to operations, as well as the activities that take place at
the bus garages will be described to paint a clearer picture of these limitations and how
they affect bus service reliability.
Figure 2-1 Ideal service reliability hierarchy and feedback loop
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2.2.1 Planning for Service Reliability
To lay the groundwork for reliable service delivery, transit agencies can set their service
standards (expectations) to reflect what their customers expect. These standards then
serve as goals and objectives during the operations planning process.
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For example, the MBTA 2004 Service Delivery Policy outlines a minimum frequency
standard for all of its bus routes as shown in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1 MBTA Service Standards for Minimum Frequency
Mode Weekday Time Periods Minimum Frequency*
Bus"
Local/Community Rts. AM & PM Peak 30-minute headway
All Other Periods 60-minute headway
(Mid-day policy objective of 30-minute
....
___headway in high density areas) .____
Saturday & Sunday - all day 60-minute headway
Express/Commuter Rts. AM Peak 3 trips in the peak direction
PM Peak 3 trips in the peak direction
Key Routes AM & PM Peak I0-minute headway
Early AM & Midday Basel Schoci 15-minute headway
Evenirg & Late Evening 20-minute headway
Saturday - all day 20-minute headway
Sunday - all day 20-minute headway
Light Rail/Heavy Rail AM & PM Peak Periods 10-minute headway
All Other Periods 15-minute headway
Saturday & Sunday - all day 15-minute headway
The MBTA then goes further and establishes service standards for reliability as shown in
Table 2-2.
Table 2-2 MBTA Service Standards for Service Reliability
Trip Test Beginning ofRoute
Mid-Route Time
Point(sl'
End of
Route
Scheduled Departure Trips Star 0 ninutes early Depart 0 morutes early Ar-ve 3 :rutes early
'Head ways •10 minutes: to 3 iinftes .ate to 7 rinutes late to 5 minutes ate
Walk-up Trips Start within 25% cf Leave within 50% of Runn g tirre wihin2C% cf scheduled(Headways <10 mrutes): scheduled headway scheduled headway rurnin ti-erurn if lime
For any given bus route to be in compliance with a the Schedule
Route Test Adherence Standard, 75% of all trips on must adhere to the above
measures over the entire service day.
*F:r Scneale Asherence, mi'cute "me points will be used only for roites on whic• ~e cIname performance data has
been cclie~ed iing CA-IAVL equi*snent
The CTA has also established its own service standards for recommended frequency for
all of its bus routes as shown in Table 2-3. These standards are set to provide enough
capacity to serve the current demand. Although the CTA has no official service standard
for reliability, policies and programs exist to discourage bus operators from running early
and to help them recover from running late.
<3030-60
60-90
90-125
125-16$
165-240
240-300
300-360
> 360
-wiWuWw ol U~WIUJ
30
20
15
12
10
7 5
6
5
<5
<30
20-40
30-45
35-50
40-55
40-60
45-60
50-60
60
(Minutes) (Average for period)
220-320 75 55-80
320-425 6 65-85
430-560 5 70-93
>560 < 5 93
(Minutes) Bus (Average)
Midday (9:00 a.m.- 3 ' 40 30 < 20
p.m.), Saturday, and 40-60 13-20Sunday 60-100 15 15-25
100-150 12 20-30
150-210 10 25-35
>210 < 10 30-40
Evening (Everyday 1 40 30 < 20
between 7 p.m. and 40-60 20 13-20
midnight) 60-100 15 15-25
100-125 12 20-25
>125 <110 21-30
Owl (Everyday < 30 30 < 15
between midnight and 30-60 20 10-20
5 a.m.) > 60 15 15-·25
Once the service standards have been set, it is up to the planning and scheduling
department to craft an operations plan that effectively utilizes agency resources to meet
the goals and objectives within the service standards. Route characteristics such as
expected running time, running time variability, and ridership are folded into the planning
process to produce an operations plan for each route. From this, the actual cycle time,
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including recovery time, is calculated and an appropriate number of buses and operators
are assigned to the route in order to meet the service standards.
It is during the planning process that the transit agency is able to take its first shot at
establishing reliable service. The operations plan that results must be robust enough to
allow service to run reliably given real world operating conditions. Physical features of
the road network (i.e. width and number of lanes), traffic conditions (i.e. variability,
traffic lights), ridership patterns, and other factors must be properly taken into account
when formulating the operations plan.
Some of the tools available to the planning department that can help improve service
reliability include schedule adjustments (running times and recovery times), and adding
extra service (spare buses and operators). Placing idle buses and operators on a route to
serve as "gap buses" in the event of a service disruption is rarer and not only is it very
expensive, but it may be impossible if the equipment spare ratios are too low. If
operators are constantly running late and unable to make their time points, scheduled
running times may be increased, or more recovery time added in order to increase service
reliability. This too can be expensive if more buses and operators are necessary to
maintain the minimum frequency requirements.
2.2.2 Service Reliability at the Garage Level
Once the operations plan has been approved, it will be up to the bus operations division
to see the plan through.
Each bus route plan consists of several pieces of work that are assigned to bus garages.
The schedule, number of hours, and amount of work all depend of the specific operations
plan for the route. Operators at each garage then bid on the work in what is usually a
quarterly, seniority-based "pick" cycle. These cycles allow operators to decide which
route(s) they want to work, the hours they are on duty, and their days off. The pick is
designed to ensure that all pieces of work get covered by an operator. The higher the
operator's seniority, the better chance they have of getting their preferred routes and work
days. In general, full-time operators will have 40 (or more) hours of work, and part-time
workers less.
Since each piece of work is covered by only one operator, the reliability of the operations
plan is vulnerable to absenteeism. An operator calling in sick or unexpectedly missing
work for any reason leaves this work open while they are absent. The garage will attempt
to cover the missing operator's work by assigning it to an extra-board operator or by
calling up another operator to work their regular day off. This is an example of another
line of defense in maintaining service reliability on the street. If the work cannot be
filled, other already assigned operators may be reassigned to cover it if it is deemed
important, leaving "less important" work to be dropped. At the CTA, this is referred to
as a "10-52, personnel shortage - run held in". Every run that is held in represents a
missing bus to customers along the entire route and it will be up to the last line of defense
- bus supervisors - to manage this problem in real-time and keep service as reliable as
possible.
Operating reliable bus service depends not only on operator availability, but also on bus
availability. A transit agency's maintenance effort must keep enough buses in operable
condition to meet peak pull-out requirements every day. Critical items such as
headlights, brakes, windshield wipers, doors, and wheelchair lifts must be in working
order before buses are allowed to hit the streets. If any critical item fails, the bus is
sidelined even before pulling out and must be replaced by a spare, if available, to be able
to make its scheduled trips for the day. With budget limitations straining transit agency
resources, maintenance continues to be hard pressed to check and repair the entire fleet
every night. Problems may go unnoticed right up until the morning pull-out check
forcing buses into the repair bay at the last minute.
It is clear that even if there are enough operators and buses to cover the day's work,
service reliability problems can still arise before they begin their runs. A last minute
wheelchair lift or door problem will force the operator to find a new bus, a move that will
potentially put him well behind schedule. If there are no more buses available due to
maintenance deficiencies, then the run may even be held-in. Garages with only one or
two pull out lanes are especially vulnerable to maintenance delays. Operators at the CTA
are required to cycle their wheelchair lifts and perform other checks before leaving the
garage. With literally hundreds of buses pulling out of the garage within a short amount
of time in the peak periods, one defective bus can lead to long delays for the buses behind
it. Other issues such as operators arriving late to work, or taking too much time to pull
out will also be detrimental to service reliability.
Once the buses begin their scheduled operations on the street, the internal policies and
processes described here interact with external factors to influence the reliability of on
street bus service. The planning and scheduling department has done its part to set up the
operations department with the frequencies, run times, and recovery times it thinks
necessary to give the best possible chance of running reliable bus service (to the extent
that the budget will allow). The garages have done their part to fill as much of the work
as possible with the available resources. Now, service reliability will be at the mercy of
the lingering effects of internal factors, external factors, and the effectiveness of the bus
service management (BSM) staff.
2.2.3 Service reliability on the street
Several factors exist that can cause service to become unreliable. While many of these
factors are external and beyond the transit agency's control, BSM must still deal with
them to provide the most reliable service possible. Internal causes of unreliability also
exist and add to the work load of BSM. Table 2-4 lists some of the common causes of
service unreliability.
Table 2-4 Causes 
of se 
y
External Factors
* Unusual traffic conditions
* Inclement weather
* Special events
* Train crossings
* Unusually high passenger demand
* Road closures
* Construction
* Police activity
Internal Factors
* Equipment failures (engine,
wheelchair lift, fare box, etc...)
* Runs held-in at the garage
* Late garage pull-outs
* Late/missing on-street reliefs
* Early/late terminal departures
* Variable operator behavior (fast and
slow operators)
With regard to the external factors, many of these should be known in advance and, with
enough preparation, service impacts can be mitigated. Special events such as a sporting
event or concert tend to draw large crowds over short periods of time. The spike in
ridership can easily overwhelm normal available capacity and disrupt the service of
nearby transit lines. However, special events are usually scheduled well in advance and
transit agencies can thus be well prepared. More capacity can be added to take care of
the crowds (depending on agency resources) while supervisors can be assigned to the
event to assist in dispatching the buses.
Construction projects, road closures, parades, and other similar events also require the
attention of BSM. These types of events generally will require buses to be rerouted
around the affected streets and to be given a modified schedule to compensate for the
new routing. Communication with the city or local department of transportation is the
key to preparing for these types of events. Once BSM knows a reroute will be necessary,
the new route is drawn up and distributed to the operators via the garage. In addition,
supervisors can be put in place in order to direct operators on the street.
Some environmental causes of service unreliability, however, are not so easy to plan for.
Traffic conditions can change and bus accidents can occur without warning. Police
activity may shut down a street or intersection requiring reroutes. Rail service may be
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suspended for some reason and suddenly demand for buses will spike. All of these
events have the potential to affect service and cause it to deviate from the operations plan
in a matter of minutes. It is then the task of BSM to spring into action and restore normal
service as quickly as possible. The actions BSM can take and the resources necessary to
do so will be outlined in the next section.
Internal factors can also lead to service unreliability. Inferior capital equipment such as
poorly designed vehicles and fare boxes have been known to cause maintenance and
operational nightmares. The MBTA recently experienced this with their new Automatic
Fare Collection system on the Washington Street Silver Line. Numerous design flaws
with the fare boxes coupled with their increased operational complexity drove travel
times and dwell times upward.
Vehicle maintenance issues can also contribute to service unreliability. If the
maintenance department of a transit agency is not able to keep up with its work load, for
example, due to funding problems, there may not be enough buses available to meet peak
requirements and consequently runs will be held in. Poorly maintained vehicles that are
on the street may become disabled ending their runs prematurely. Either way, every run
that is not on the street represents a gap in service to BSM and ultimately to the
customers on the street waiting for service.
Operator discipline plays a large role in the delivery of reliable bus service.
Absenteeism, tardiness, and variable driving behavior are all detrimental to service
quality. Excessive absenteeism will lead to runs being held-in when there are not enough
operators to cover all runs. On-street reliefs, where an operator will relieve another of
their duty and take over mid-route, may be compromised as well, and this will cause
serious delays in service. Operators who pull out of the garage late risk starting their first
trip late or missing it altogether. It will then be up to BSM to put them in place
(deadhead back on schedule) and manage any gaps in service. Finally, differences in
driving habits among operators can cause service to be less than ideal. Fast operators
coupled with inexperienced or slow operators on the same route will inevitably produce
gaps and bunches. On high frequency routes, terminal departure discipline is key: prior
research has shown that operators leaving bunched from a terminal have little chance to
achieve the scheduled headway downstream while operators that leave with a large
headway will only lose ground as they move along the route. While in the end it is up to
the operators to control their own behavior, agency policies and management style
strongly influence working conditions and morale.
2.3 Bus Service Management
The internal and external factors described in the previous subsection will continue to
affect service reliability if left unchecked. Barker (2002) outlines the following common
service disruptions:
* Bus early
* Bus delay (short headway route)
* Bus delay (long headway route)
* Crush load (one bus, not delayed)
* Mechanical problem (minor - bus movable)
* Mechanical problem (serious - bus movable without passengers)
* Mechanical problem (major - bus immobilized)
* Emergency / Security / Fare Dispute
* Accident
* Operator Misses Relief
* Blockage
* Bus Standing / Service Gap
* Unfilled Run
* Unplanned Bus Bridge
* Congestion / Weather / Route-wide Crowding
* Late Pull-Out
Ultimately, these disruptions can lead to:
* Excess passenger waiting times
* Excess passenger travel times
* Crowded vehicles
* Overtime pay for delayed operators
Fortunately, the factors causing service unreliability can be checked on the street. A team
of supervisors, control center dispatchers, and maintenance vehicles that make up the bus
service management team are deployed throughout the service area to help mitigate
service disruptions and to keep service as reliable as possible. In Theory and Practice in
Service Management (Froloff et al., 1994), bus service management (BSM) is broadly
defined by the RATP (Paris, France) as the department responsible for overseeing transit
operations and taking the necessary actions to bring these operations in line with the
service quality objectives of the transit agency. In other words, BSM serves to manage
bus operations in real-time to ensure that the service being delivered on the street
resembles as closely as possible the prescribed operations plan. The more often this
occurs, the more reliable the service.
The following subsections describe the tools and the resources necessary for BSM to do
their job.
2.3.1 Operations Control Toolbox
Bus supervisors, in the control center or in the field, have a variety of tools available to
them in the form of service restoration actions that can be employed to maintain, or
restore, reliable service, including:
* Space back
* Express
* Move up
* Short turn
* Fill-in
Space Back
Spacing back is the process of slowing down, or holding back, one or more runs ahead of
a service gap in order to divide the gap among multiple runs. Spacing back can be done
at a terminal or mid-route. Spacing back is most effective when the buses that are being
held are empty and when a large number of passengers are waiting to board immediately
downstream. That way travel time delays for passengers already on board are minimized
while the benefits of lower expected waiting times are conferred on those passengers
waiting downstream. By the same token, spacing back is generally not beneficial if buses
have already reached the main distribution zone (e.g. the central business district during
the AM peak): buses will be full of passengers seeking to alight and will have very few
passengers waiting to board downstream.
In order to space back, supervisors first need to know that a service gap exists. Once
detected, the location of the service gap must be known so that, combined with the
knowledge of the route's load profile, supervisors can determine if spacing back will be
beneficial as discussed in the previous paragraph. If deemed beneficial, supervisors will
need to be able to communicate with the bus operators in front of the service gap in order
to execute a space back. This can be done in person or wirelessly via radio or digital
messaging.
In most transit agencies, supervisors are only aware of service gaps when the gap reaches
them. If a hold-in or late pull-out is broadcast over the radio, supervisors should be able
to act in front of the gap. However, a congested radio system may limit broadcasts to
emergencies only or delay announcements until it is too late to act on them. This leaves
supervisors in the dark about service gaps until they notice a missing, or late, run by
which time it will be too late to act on as they are now behind the gap. Supervisors can
however radio ahead to another supervisor on the route to take action, as long as there is
sufficient communications capacity to do so.
Express
Expressing buses is the process of having a bus allow passengers to alight only or go "out
of service" for a short period of time before returning to local service. This service
restoration action is meant to close a service gap from behind by affording the expressed
bus a shorter travel time. The best time to express a bus is when there is a bus bunch
behind a service gap. The first bus from the bunch is expressed into the gap while the
second bus remains in local service.
The main advantage of expressing buses is that supervisors can work service gaps from
behind. This requires less information and communications than working in front of the
gap since the supervisor already knows a gap exists when the bus to be expressed reaches
his location.
Expressing buses however has several drawbacks. First, supervisors must be confident
that there is a second bus close behind. If not, passengers who have already suffered
waiting through the service gap will now have to watch an expressed bus pass them with
no other bus in sight. This alone can cause transit agencies to shy away from allowing
buses to be expressed. Second, there is no guarantee that an expressed bus can
effectively catch up and successfully fill a service gap. Traffic conditions and other
factors can make this infeasible. Finally, capacity issues may arise: the bus following
the expressed bus will now have to pick up effectively twice as many people as normal
and may not have enough capacity to do so.
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Move Up
Moving up is the process of having buses depart a terminal earlier than scheduled. This
action is meant to divide a service gap among at least two runs when it is known that the
preceding run is missing or severely delayed.
For example, buses are scheduled to depart a terminal every 10 minutes beginning at
0700. If it is known that the 0710 run is missing, then moving up runs can divide the
service gap.
0720 (Twice the normal headway)
0730
0740
0750
0714 (+6 minutes)
0727 (+3 minutes)
0740
0750
As shown in Table 2-5, the 0720 run now has twice the normal preceding headway and
most likely twice the number of passengers to pick up at the terminal and downstream.
Besides capacity issues, the increased dwell time due to picking up more passengers will
likely cause this run to fall behind downstream and eventually bunch up with the 0730
run.
Using the move up action can mitigate this problem by dividing the service gap over the
three following runs. The 0720 run is moved up by six minutes to 0714, and then the
0730 run by three minutes to 0727. This creates one 14-minute headway and two 13-
minute headways.
Moving up buses at the terminal requires, above all, the ability to communicate with the
operators turning at the terminal. It also requires that the runs to be moved up be at the
terminal before they need to depart. Information about where the following runs are (in
this example, the 0720 and 0730 runs) is very helpful but not required in order to
optimally space the terminal. Not knowing if these runs will actually be able to turn at
the terminal when desired (0714 and 0727 respectively) could lead to suboptimal spacing
or even a worse situation than if nothing was done. If the 0730 run was missing too,
blindly moving up the 0720 by 6 minutes will lead to a 14 minute gap and a 26 minute
gap, as opposed to two 20 minute gaps.
Short Turn and Fill In
Short turning and filling in are two ways to reallocate service in order to fill a gap. Short
turning involves turning a bus around before it reaches its terminal and having it begin a
new trip immediately on the same route but now in the opposite direction. Filling in
involves pulling a bus from another nearby route - usually one that intersects or shares a
trunk portion - and reassigning it to the route being filled.
Both of these actions can quickly fill a gap but at a great cost to the route/direction where
the bus is coming from. Once a bus is chosen to be short turned or interlined, passengers
on the reassigned bus must alight and wait for the next bus. Even if there are no
passengers on board, reassigning a bus will create a new service gap on the affected
route/direction which will then have to be managed.
Given these tradeoffs, short turning and filling in from another route are actions to be
used only during the most serious situations. Even when warranted, steps must be taken
to ensure that the negative effects on the displaced passengers are minimized. This
means making sure that there is enough capacity left on the donor route and that any gaps
created by pulling a bus are not too great for downstream passengers.
Resource Needs
Spacing back, expressing, moving up, short turning, and filling in are all very powerful
tools for service restoration. Each one can be used independently or in combination to
address different kinds of service problems and to maintain service reliability. Each one
also requires differing amounts of resources to be effective. Table 2-6 summarizes these
properties.
As will be described in the next section, the more robust the information and
communications, the more informed choices supervisors can make among service
restoration options. In addition, time is of the essence when responding to delays and
service gaps since delays get worse over time without intervention, leading to larger
service gaps and higher unreliability (Barker, 2002). The faster that bus service
management can detect and respond to service gaps, the more reliable bus service will
become.
Table 2-6 Service restoration resource needs
Location of service gap.
Delivery of instructions to operators that
Manage service Headway of bus(es) to be will be spaced back.
gaps from in front. spaced back.
Communications with supervisors along
Slow down Load profile of route route so that they are aware. May be
operators ahead of (passengers on board buses direct communication with operator
schedule. to be spaced back, (radio, text, in-person), or communication
passengers waiting to board via another supervisor.
downstream).
Location of service gap. Delivery of instructions to operators that
will be expressed.
Headway of bus(es) to be
Manage service expressed. Headway of Communications with supervisors along
gaps from behind, immediate follower(s). route so that they are aware. May be
Express direct communication with operator
Speed up operators Load profile of route (radio, text, in-person), or communication
behind schedule. (passengers on board buses via another supervisor.
to be expressed, passengers
waiting to board Communication with passengers that are
downstream). being passed up if possible.
Location of service gap. Delivery of instructions to operators that
Manage service Arrival and departure time of will be moved up.
gaps from behind. bus(es) to be moved up at
ve Up Re-spac a terminal. Communications with supervisors alongMRe-space terminal route so that they are aware. May be
when runs are Arrival and departure time of direct communication with operator
missing. immediate leader and (radio, text, in-person), or communication
immediate follower. avia another supervisor.immediate follower.
Manage service Delivery of instructions to operators that
gaps by redirecting will be short turned.
service from the Location of service gap.r i   
opposite direction, Location and headways of Communications with supervisors along
same route. candidate short turn buses route so that they are aware. May beSh ncandidate short turn busesShort Turn running in opposite direction, direct communication with operator
Put operator back (radio, text, in-person), or communication
on schedule. Load profile of both via another supervisor.
Move capacity to directions. Communication to passengers who are
where it is needed. displaced is absolute necessity.
Delivery of instructions to operators that
will be used in fill-in.
Manage service Location of service gap.
gaps by moving Communications with supervisors along
service in from Location and headways of affected routes so that they are aware.
Fill In another route. buses on nearby routes that May be direct communication with
could act as a fill in bus. operator (radio, text, in-person), or
Move capacity to communication via another supervisor.
where it is needed. Load profile on both routes
Communication to passengers who are
displaced is absolute necessity.
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2.3.2 Resource Needs and Availability
Different types of resources are required for Bus Service Management to maintain and
restore bus service reliability effectively. These resources fall into three categories:
Information, Communication, and Personnel.
Information
Information is arguably the most important resource to have for a bus supervision team.
As shown is Figure 2-2, historical information gives the team the ability to plan ahead
and develop strategies for service maintenance and restoration. The team can use the
information - be it archived AVL/APC data or supervisor reports - to identify the most
common disruptions and to pinpoint the probable causes. A strategy to counter these
disruptions can then be developed and implemented. Elements of this strategy could
include standard operating procedures that outline which service restoration actions to
take, the service problems that will trigger these actions, and where supervisors should be
deployed in order to execute these actions. Historical information can then be utilized to
analyze the effectiveness of this strategy.
Figure 2-2 Use of historical information
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While archived information can help in developing supervision strategies, it is the
availability and level of real-time information that determines how effective these
strategies will be. When more is known about a route or a network, a greater number of
tools becomes available to bus supervision and the use of these tools becomes more
effective as shown in Table 2-6.
In its most basic form, real-time information comes from the eyes and ears of the
supervisors on the street, personnel in the garage, and from the operators driving the
buses. Information relevant to service reliability such as the location of buses, schedule
adherence, headways, missing runs, and major incidents is scattered throughout the
agency at any given time. Operators know their own location, garage personnel know
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which runs have been held in, and field supervisors are aware of headways as buses pass
their location. However, the key for successful bus supervision is to get all of this
information in one place and delivered to the people who can act on it in a timely matter
- preferably in real-time.
More advanced real-time information systems serve to collect all of this data
automatically, and then report it in an easy to read format (such as a dynamically updated
map) in a central location. This central location can be in the control center, or it can be
on a personal digital assistant (PDA) or laptop in the hands of field supervisors. By using
such advanced systems, transit agencies can empower their control center and field
supervisors with the information necessary to make better decisions regarding service
reliability.
Communications
As information starts to become available automatically in real-time, a transit agency's
communication structure will start (or continue) to become the bottleneck in
implementing service restoration actions. A reliable, efficient communications system
with sufficient capacity will allow for the information sharing necessary to execute
appropriate service restoration actions in the field and provide reliable bus service.
Communications does not have to be thought of as only voice communications over
radios, or telephones. With the advent of real-time AVL information systems, wireless
data transmissions are becoming just as important. Where, in the current system, bus
delays, bus locations, and other pieces of relevant information are communicated by
voice radio, real-time AVL systems broadcast this information digitally over a wireless
network. Even with a digital wireless network, communications capacity and reliability
will still be important issues in ensuring that relevant information is transmitted reliably
and in a timely manner to the people who can act on it.
Personnel
Personnel refer to the field, mobile, and control center supervisors who utilize the
information and communications infrastructure to make decisions regarding service
restoration and maintenance. These are the people on the front line of bus supervision
who monitor service (gathering information), execute service restoration actions as they
see fit, and communicate these actions and their observations to their peers in the field
and in the control center. Their ability to make the best service restoration decisions
depends largely on how much real-time information they have in addition to their
experience and training. Their ability to execute these decisions depends on how well
they are able to communicate with their peers and with the bus operators. Their ability to
be effective in maintaining and restoring service reliability depends on the strategy
planning beforehand (service restoration tools and responsibilities given to them, their
location, and their knowledge of the route).
Supervisory personnel fall into three main categories: post supervisors, mobile
supervisors, and the control center staff. Each type of supervisor has different
capabilities in terms of monitoring service on the street and the ability to respond to
certain situations.
Post Supervisors
Post supervisors are supervisors who man posts located within a transit agency's bus
network. Post locations are usually bus terminals or major intersections where the
supervisor is able to monitor multiple bus routes passing his location. In the most basic
form, a post supervisor is armed with a supervisor's guide detailing each run passing his
location with a run number and arrival time, and a radio to communicate with other
supervisors and possibly also with bus operators. By comparing their observations with
the supervisor guide, supervisors can quickly determine if a bus is running late or if
headways are uneven. They can then choose to act on this information or pass it on to
their peers depending on the situation - assuming there is enough communications
capacity to do so in a timely manner.
In general, post supervisors are given full discretion in managing their posts meaning that
they are able to employ all of the service restoration actions described earlier.
Traditionally, the major constraints on the effectiveness of post supervisors are a lack of
automatic real-time information and serious capacity constraints on communications.
The only information available to them is the information they collect with their eyes and
ears, and any information they hear broadcast over the radio (severe delays, accidents,
runs held-in, etc.). Communications constraints are typically severe as described earlier
in this section, limiting their ability to make sound service restoration decisions, and
frequently resulting in the "do-nothing" option being the only one feasible.
Without an automatic real-time information system, the post supervisor only knows
where buses are as they pass his location, giving him, at best, historical data on headways
and schedule adherence. As discussed earlier, this severely limits his ability to make
service restoration decisions. A strong communications network however can partially
compensate for a lack of automatic real-time information. If there is enough
communications capacity, supervisors can radio to one another their observations at their
posts, such as headways, schedule adherence, or any service restoration actions they have
taken. Supervisors standing at a post will then have virtually up to the minute
information on route conditions at posts upstream and downstream of their location and
this will aid in the decision making process.
In addition to service monitoring and service restoration, post supervisors often have to
take on other tasks. Repairing defective equipment is a large part of their responsibility
as they are usually the first line of defense in taking care of minor problems such as fare
box defects, broken mirrors, and the like. Post supervisors also represent the transit
agency in the field and often assist customers. Other duties include setting up emergency
reroutes, enforcing terminal and right-of-way space, and managing on-street reliefs.
Mobile Supervisors
Mobile supervisors are typically assigned to patrol a small portion of the bus network in a
vehicle. Their primary responsibility is to respond to incidents and emergencies as
assigned by the control center. While not on assignment, mobile supervisors can monitor
and restore service just as a post supervisor would.
When responding to an incident, mobile supervisors become the transit agency's primary
incident commander. They are responsible for ensuring the safety of both the operator
and the passengers, and making sure that passengers are able to board the next bus to
continue on their way. Mobile supervisors must also be able to interface with police and
fire authorities as necessary. If a tow or a mobile repair truck is needed at the scene,
mobile supervisors will work with the control center on dispatching one.
Control Center
Control Center supervisors are usually referred to as dispatchers and are primarily
responsible for coordinating incident and delay responses between operators and field
supervisors. Typically, operators will report delays or incidents to the control center so
that they can receive assistance or instructions to recover. The dispatchers at the control
center can then relay the delay or incident information to field supervisors so that they
can respond as instructed.
Being the central nerve system of the supervision team, the control center works best
when the dispatchers have accurate and timely information on the entire operations
picture, and sufficient communications capacity to be able to coordinate responses among
field staff.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has presented a literature review on service reliability, operations control,
and bus supervision. Following the literature review, a description of service reliability
was given from multiple perspectives. Finally, a detailed description of bus supervision
practice was given, including operations control capabilities and resource needs. The
next chapter will present a framework to analyze bus supervision and its effectiveness
with respect to bus service reliability.
3 Framework for Analyzing Bus Supervision
This chapter will focus on the development of a framework to analyze service reliability
and specifically the contribution of bus supervision towards improving reliability.
3.1 Framework Introduction
The prior research presented in chapter 2 has shown several ways to analyze bus service
reliability. It has also shown the theoretical benefits that could be achieved through
operations control. Finally, the prior research has covered how bus supervision could be
a partial solution to the reliability problem but that there are several impediments to
supervisors achieving their full potential, including communications constraints,
information sharing problems, and task assignment issues.
To organize this complex topic, a framework for analyzing and improving the
effectiveness of bus supervision is proposed. The goal of the framework will be to
formalize the process through which bus supervision is assessed and deployed based on
available resources. The framework will also aim to aid in resource planning by
identifying the most effective deployment strategies. The steps in the proposed
framework are:
1) Assessment
2) Development of Strategies
3) Evaluation of Strategies
By applying this framework to the CTA and the MBTA, this research will be able to
draw conclusions regarding effective bus supervision deployment strategies to improve
bus service reliability.
3.2 Assessment
There are two types of assessment proposed. The first is an assessment of the available
supervision resources and its deployment, and the second is the assessment of the bus
service reliability problem.
3.2.1 Supervision Resource Assessment
In order to fully understand the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of bus
supervision, the current level of supervisory resources must first be assessed. As
discussed previously, these resources fall under the general categories of information,
communications, and personnel. By taking inventory of these resources, a "resource
state" can be determined. This resource state will affect the potential effectiveness of bus
supervision and its deployment, and can point the way towards worthwhile upgrades.
Table 3-1 suggests possible resource levels at a transit agency.
Table 3-1 uggested Resource Levels
Level Information Communications Personnel
No real-time or archived bus Dispatchers, supervisors, Few or no dispatchers,
location, passenger count,or maintenance information and operators can only supervisors, and support
mwhatsoever, communicate face-to-face. staff.whatsoever.
No real-time information. Radio communication Dispatchers and supervisors
1 Archived information based between dispatchers, available for incident
on manual collection. supervisors, and operators. response.
Radio and text Dispatchers and supervisorsNo real-time information. R a2 Archived information, communication between available for incident2 Archived information
collected automatically. dispatchers, supervisors, response AND
and operators. headway/schedule control.
Automatime and arcolleced busreal- Digital voice and data Support staff available fortime and archived bus communications between data analysis, superVision3 location, passenger count, dispatchers, supervisors, strategy development, andinford maintenance onoperators, and equipment. implementation.
information.
Four possible resource levels are defined for each category. Level 0 indicates a complete
lack of investment in a particular category, severely limiting supervision effectiveness.
In this state, supervisors (if any) do not know where buses are in real-time, or the profile
of bus routes in the network, and cannot effectively communicate with operators or one
another. This lack of information and communications makes it very hard for a transit
agency to conduct even basic incident response, let alone headway or schedule control.
Furthermore, the lack of archived information on bus schedules and passenger behavior
hinders planners and schedulers in their quest to improve service.
On the other end of the spectrum, a resource level of 3 in each category reflects an
advanced stage of investment allowing for, the most effective supervisory function. In
this state, supervisors are well equipped with the information and communications
infrastructure they need in order to effectively respond to incidents and maintain reliable
service. In addition, there is sufficient personnel to handle both functions as well as
analyze archived information.
As supervision resources are built up at a transit agency, levels are not necessarily similar
across all three categories. Information could be at a "2", communications at a "1", and
personnel at a "3". This is important for an agency to know in order for them to identify
current resource bottlenecks and possible over-investment. In this example, the
hypothetical transit agency with this type of resource state could be over-invested in
personnel. The lack of real-time information and digital communications leaves the staff
without the resources necessary to maintain reliable service through operations control.
On the flip-side of the coin, the same transit agency could be said to be under-invested in
information and communications and upgrading these resources would improve bus
supervision and service reliability.
3.2.2 Service Reliability Assessment
When attempting to solve any problem, the problem must first be understood before a
solution can be developed. This principle holds true for bus service reliability. After
conducting an assessment of supervision resources, transit agencies need next to conduct
an assessment on their current bus service reliability.
As defined in Chapter 2, bus service reliability is measured through on-time performance
(low frequency routes), or headway regularity (high frequency routes). The amount and
quality of archived data available will greatly affect the quality of the service reliability
assessment. An agency with a fully equipped fleet featuring AVL and APC systems will
potentially have a much clearer picture of the reliability problem than an agency relying
on manual data collection.
Assessing service reliability is done at two levels: the route level, and the system or
network level.
System Level Assessment
At the system level, transit agencies can look for unreliability trends that are affecting
most, if not all their network. By identifying these trends, a supervision deployment
strategy can be developed to counter them and improve reliability. Similarly, in-house
procedures such as scheduling or labor policies can be adjusted to counter internal
unreliability trends.
When conducting a system level reliability assessment, transit agencies should look for
trends that can be addressed with system level strategies. For example, a system-level
strategy would be to redeploy personnel or to upgrade resources. Utilizing archived AVL
and APC data, several system-wide reliability measures can be tracked including:
* Terminal departure and arrival performance
* Overall on-time performance
* Overall headway consistency
* Missing or "held-in" runs
* Maintenance delays
* Garage pull-out performance
Once these measures have been tabulated, it can be helpful to sort them by time of day
(morning peak, afternoon, etc.) and by geographical region. As shown by the example in
Table 3-2, this can lead to the development of targeted solutions, such as scheduling
improvements for on-time performance, new labor policies for held-in runs, or specific
supervision deployments by geographical region and/or time for a host of unreliability
problems. Developing supervision deployment strategies based on an unreliability
analysis (and available resources) will be further discussed in the next subsection.
Table 3-2 Example of system-wide unreliability trends and solutions
System-Wide Unreliability Trend Possible Solutions
Assign supervisors to terminals. Increase
Late terminal departures or headway variability recovery times. Give operators
at terminals schedule/headway information in-vehicle and
encourage operators to depart on-time.
Increase terminal departure performance.
Control mid-route through supervision. AdjustHighly variable travel times running time schedule. Add signal priority and
exclusive lanes.
Address relevant labor and maintenance
Frequent "hold-ins" issues. Assign supervisors at terminals to
restore service.
Route Level Assessment
Cham (2006) developed a comprehensive process for route level assessment. The
process involves creating a set of measures to characterize the degree of service
unreliability, identifying the causes of unreliability, and then selecting appropriate
strategies to improve service unreliability (supervisory or otherwise). The next few
paragraphs will summarize Cham's approach to the first two parts of route level
reliability assessment. Discussion of selecting appropriate strategies will follow.
a) Characterizing Service Unreliability
To characterize the level of service unreliability, a large amount of data on the route in
question must be analyzed. The most important data sources are those that track vehicle
and passenger activity. AVL and APC data sources are best since they record detailed
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vehicle movements such as stop arrival time, and dwell time which then lead to headway
and schedule adherence measures. APC's can also record passenger boarding and
alighting counts leading to a picture of bus load variation along the entire route.
Using the AVL and APC data on a specific route, the state of service unreliability can
now be characterized. For high frequency routes, the headway adherence at terminals
and at mid-route stops can be measured, whereas for low frequency routes, schedule
adherence is more important.
The analysis of the AVL and APC data can finally be used to generate performance
reports summarizing the service reliability. This can be a report on the percent of trips
during a specific time period that adhere to the schedule, or adhere to the headway.
Excess passenger waiting times can also be calculated to quantify the effects of
unreliability on passenger travel experience.
b) Identifying Causes of Unreliability
With the level of unreliability assessed, the next step is to identify likely causes so that
solutions, supervisory or otherwise, can be developed. Cham describes two main causes
of unreliability: deviations at terminals, and deviations at other points.
Deviations at terminals were cited as important because this is where service reliability
should be at its best. Terminals serve as the "restart" point where prior deviations should
be prevented from carrying over to the next trip. Poor terminal performance tends to
propagate along the route, making reliability here paramount if the route is going to
operate reliably overall.
Several causes of unreliability at terminals were cited by Cham including:
* Lack of available recovery time.
* Adequate recovery time but poor schedule adherence or headway adherence due
to operator behavior or lack of supervision.
Deviations at other points along the route will also cause service to become unreliable -
again meaning that either buses go off schedule, or their headways become too short or
too long. These deviations can occur because of poor terminal departure performance
(with the performance propagating down the route), or other factors including irregular
passenger demand, inadequate scheduling, operator behavior, or externalities such as
traffic and weather conditions.
Some measures that can help identify mid-route deviations are running time and dwell
time distributions. If trips have good terminal departure performance but have a widely
distributed running time, inadequate scheduling, operator behavior, or other externalities
may be to blame. If dwell times are inconsistent from trip to trip, irregular passenger
demand may be leading to differing travel times and thus unreliability.
3.3 Development of Strategies
Before supervision is considered, every effort must be made to eliminate internal causes
of unreliability. Schedules need to be set so that running time variability is low, and most
trips have sufficient recovery time at the terminals. Labor policies need to be defined in
such a way that absenteeism is minimized and good operator behavior is encouraged. By
doing so, supervisors will not have to fix problems created by the transit agency itself and
can focus instead on maintaining reliable service given the myriad of external factors
they face (such as accidents, traffic, weather, and passenger demand).
Once the supervisory resources are known, and the system and route level unreliability
characteristics and causes identified, a set of supervision strategies can be developed.
These strategies will be defined to make the best use of the limited personnel given
constraints on information and communication.
In general, supervision deployment, including personnel and responsibilities, can be
distributed among the control center, mobile supervisors, and post supervisors. The most
effective type of deployment strategy will depend primarily on the supervision resource
state.
3.3.1 Distribution of Responsibilities
As mentioned previously, supervisors have many responsibilities. For this study
however, supervision responsibilities that are related to service reliability can be broken
up into four main tasks:
* Incident detection - initial discovery that an accident, breakdown, or similar
"standing vehicle" event has occurred.
* Incident response - coordination of, and response to the incident.
* Service disruption detection - initial discovery of unreliable service through
events such as a long headway, late bus, or missing service.
* Service restoration - coordination of, and execution of operation control strategies
to restore reliable service.
Depending on the state of information and communication resources as shown in Table
3-1, each task will be the joint or individual responsibility of the control center, mobile
supervisors, and post supervisors.
a) Incident detection and response
Incident detection and response always begins in the field with the operator who
generally reports a problem to his/her supervisor or the control center, however, as
information and communication capabilities increase, these tasks will increasingly fall
within the realm of the control center as shown in Table 3-3.
etection and response
A - Incident detection and response by field supervisors only.
B - Control center receives incident reports from the field and coordinates response.
C - Control center automatically detects incidents and coordinates response.
In the most primitive resource state, field supervisors will be the only ones capable of
responding to incidents. Operators lacking any effective communications will be unable
to alert control center dispatchers or field supervisors, and will have to rely on passing a
post supervisor for assistance, or having a mobile supervisor see them if they are unable
to move (or using a personal cell phone to contact someone).
In all other resource states except for full information and communications, bus operators
will have a radio available and can notify the control center immediately after an incident
occurs. This represents a shift of incident detection responsibility from the field
supervisors to the control center. Of course, the bus operator is still the primary incident
detector and any delays in reporting the incident (the operator may attempt to first repair
the vehicle on their own, for example) can negatively affect service reliability. Once the
control center is aware of an incident, dispatchers can coordinate a response as necessary
between field supervisors, the operator, and local authorities.
If real-time AVL information is available, and communications are advanced enough,
incident detection can become automatic as individual buses stream their "health"
information into the control center. Dispatchers would then be immediately notified of
the incident location and perhaps the type of incident as well, further improving response
times. This type of incident detection represents a complete shift of responsibility into
the control center.
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It should be noted that across all resources states, it will be the task of the field
supervisors to actually respond to an incident. This will be the case whether they detect
an incident, or if the control center detects it and coordinates a response.
b) Service disruption detection and service restoration
Service disruptions can occur in two forms, depending on the bus route frequency. If the
route has a low frequency, a service disruption is defined as a bus becoming excessively
late or early relative to its schedule. For high frequency routes, a service disruption is
defined as a headway that is excessively long or short.
Without real-time information or effective communications, field supervisors and
operators will be primarily responsible for detecting service disruptions and for restoring
service. For low frequency routes, this means that operators will bear the greatest
responsibility for keeping their bus on time. If this becomes a problem due to traffic,
maintenance, or other circumstances, then field supervisors will become responsible for
assisting the operator in returning to schedule. For high frequency routes, neither the
operator nor the supervisor will have the information necessary to detect service
disruptions, let alone restore service. Headway gap detection requires that the supervisor
or operator know the position of consecutive buses, knowledge that is not possible
without real-time AVL information. This means that full headway management on high-
frequency routes will not be possible until advanced information and communication
resources are in place.
For transit agencies with reliable communications, some service disruption detection
responsibilities will move into the control center, but the vast majority will remain in the
field as before. Service disruptions resulting from hold-ins, incidents, or excessive delays
can be reported into the control center from operators or other personnel. This
information can then be broadcast to supervisors to give them a chance to act on it before
the situation deteriorates further, as opposed to waiting for the problem to reach them
first. Even with a dependable communications system, service disruption response still
depends heavily on the operator and supervisor reporting hold-ins, incidents, and delays
in timely manner. Service disruption detection and service restoration are still quite
inefficient at this resource state, especially for high frequency routes.
Once real-time AVL information becomes available, complete schedule and headway
management becomes possible, and this task will move into the control center.
Dispatchers will have the ability to instantly see if service disruptions are forming in low
or high frequency routes, and will be able to contact operators with the appropriate
service restoration instructions. As information processing technology and
communications become stronger, automatic service monitoring may become possible.
This will allow dispatchers to focus on the service disruptions and to quickly
communicate via text messages to field supervisors and operators. Service restoration
instructions can also be communicated to operators through the use of "ring-off'
departure bells at terminals, or in-vehicle messages.
3.3.2 Distribution of Personnel
The number and deployment of mobile, post, and control center supervisors will depend
greatly on the level of information and communication resources. As discussed in the
previous section, different supervision personnel will be able to take on more
responsibility as resources increase, while others will see their responsibilities level off or
even be reduced. These changes in task assignment will affect the way that supervisors
are deployed to take advantage of the increased resource.
a) Low resource state
At the most primitive of resources states, all supervision tasks are done in the field.
Establishing a control center at this stage would not be prudent since dispatchers would
not have any information on service conditions nor the means to communicate any
instruction.
A "low resource state" may not be a reflection of the actual resources available, but may
be a temporary state when communications go down, or when communications capacity
is insufficient. Since capacity issues usually arise when most incidents occur - the peak
hour period - the "low resource state" could still be considered appropriate.
Without an effective communications system, all incidents and service disruptions will
have to be detected and responded to by field personnel. This will require a large number
of supervisors just to cover the network to look for incidents and service disruptions.
Obviously this is a poor use of an expensive personnel resource and every effort should
be made to upgrade communication resources before any more supervisors are hired.
b) Medium resource state
If there are at least reliable radio communications available between operators and
supervisors, establishing an effective control center is clearly appropriate. This increase
in resources allows incident response to shift into the control center and will require that
enough personnel be present to effectively handle all incident calls in a timely manner.
In addition, more dispatchers may be needed to handle service disruption calls coming in
from the field or the garages.
As the control center takes primary responsibility for incident detection, fewer field
supervisors will be necessary for incident and service disruption detection. However,
there still needs to be a sufficient number of mobile supervisors to quickly respond as
directed by the control center. If there are too few mobile supervisors, the number of
incidents may outstrip the ability of supervisors to respond creating additional service
delays. Mobile supervisors also may not be able to cover large geographic areas in a
timely fashion if their numbers are too low. Additional tasks such as service restoration,
or on-street relief management, may also require additional mobile supervisors.
Post supervisors will not be needed nearly as much as mobile supervisors. Being
stationary, they are not well suited for incident response, and without real-time AVL
information, they are unable to effectively monitor and restore service. Post supervisors
can, however, contribute to service reliability in other ways but their numbers will
depend on the priority a transit agency puts on those contributions.
Being on foot, post supervisors are able to interact easily with customers and operators,
lending support and assistance whenever it is needed. If they are positioned in the right
locations, such as a busy terminal, post supervisors can help keep terminal departures on
time and perform minor repairs on buses to keep them on the street (e.g. fixing defective
fareboxes, swapping for working buses, repairing loose mirrors). They can also perform
some service restoration if the control center is able to give them delay information in a
timely manner.
If transit agencies value service reliability highly, then post supervisors should
concentrate first and foremost on keeping terminal departures on time. Without real-time
AVL information or timely delay information over the radio, this will be the best that
post supervisors can do to ensure reliable service. Supervisors can then focus on
maintenance issues that keep buses on the street, as this task will contribute to reliability.
Mid-route locations do not offer any of these opportunities unique to post supervisors and
should only be considered for reasons other than service reliability.
c) High resource state
Moving to the highest resource states will serve two purposes. The first will be to
improve service reliability by giving supervisors, dispatchers, and operators the tools that
they need, and the second will be to lower total personnel requirements by improving the
effectiveness of individual supervisors.
With real-time AVL information and full communications capabilities, control center
responsibilities increase as well as the personnel needs. More dispatchers will be needed
to monitor the real-time information stream for service disruptions and to communicate to
operators and field supervisors any required service restoration instructions. The task of
service monitoring and restoration is not trivial and will require additional staff beyond
that already required for incident response.
Since the control center is now able to coordinate incident response and service
restoration, fewer mobile supervisors will be needed than before. Their primary task of
incident response will still exist, but auxiliary assignments such as service monitoring
and restoration will now be handled by the control center.
Even fewer post supervisors will be needed in this advanced resource state. The control
center will be responsible for monitoring and restoring service, reducing post supervisors
roles. Terminal departure control as well as other operational control will be conducted
centrally. Transit agencies can still utilize post supervisors though at major terminals or
other places where they can offer customer assistance, perform maintenance, or provide a
presence that the control center cannot (and may need to, for enforcement purposes for
example).
If technological advances are sufficient, overall personnel requirements can be reduced
even further. Automatic information processing can be introduced into the control center,
relieving dispatchers of the task of service monitoring. This will allow them to focus
instead on exception based reports such as long headways or buses that are off schedule.
Automatic communications may also be introduced, giving operators in-vehicle
instructions based on their current headway and schedule status. Instructions can also be
delivered through terminal departure cues such as lights or bells, alerting operators of the
appropriate departure time based on current conditions. These types of systems can have
the overall effect of reducing personnel needs by automating tasks previously carried out
by dispatchers and supervisors.
3.4 Evaluation of Strategies
After reviewing the possible supervision deployment strategies, it is important to conduct
an evaluation to determine which supervision strategy best fits the available resources
and state of reliability. This section will cover the system and route level evaluations.
3.4.1 System Evaluation
In evaluating a supervision deployment strategy, a transit agency must ask itself:
* Are the right tasks being assigned to address the principle causes of service
unreliability?
* If not, are resource investments necessary to carry out these tasks? If so, which
resources and how much investment is needed?
* Are supervision personnel overwhelmed with their tasks or mostly idle due to a
lack of work?
By answering these questions, transit agencies can further fine tune their deployment
strategies, personnel numbers, and resource investments. These questions are discussed
below.
Task Assignment
For a supervision deployment strategy to be successful, it must be able to address the
principle causes of service unreliability. If incidents have been determined to cause most
unreliability problems, then incident response should show improvement in the new
strategy. This may mean faster response times to incidents and the resulting delay.
Deployment strategies that have not addressed the principle causes of unreliability will
need to be adjusted so that they do. This may mean shifts in personnel to mobile
supervisors to improve incident response time and to dispatchers to handle the calls.
Resource Investments
If the task required to address unreliability is currently infeasible due to resource
constraints, then plans for investing in improved information or communications systems
may be necessary. This situation can come about, for example, if terminal departure
performance is poor and no real-time AVL information is available. The task of
managing headways would be impossible since neither the field supervisors nor the
control center know what the headways are in the first place. An investment in real-time
AVL information would enable supervisors to carry out this task, provided
communications capabilities are sufficient.
Personnel
With tasks and personnel being redeployed to the field or to the control center, transit
agencies will have to monitor the work load to make sure that there are enough, but not
too many personnel assigned to the right place. This problem can come up right after a
major resource investment when new tasks become available and when personnel may
have been redeployed.
For example, after a real-time AVL information system comes online along with
improved communications, control center dispatchers may initially be overwhelmed with
their new responsibility of monitoring and managing service unless their numbers are
increased. Meanwhile, post supervisors who used to be responsible for monitoring
service will see their roles and their numbers drastically reduced.
Constant evaluation of task assignment, personnel assignment, resources, and service
reliability will be required over the long run to ensure that the supervision deployment
strategy still meets the needs of the transit agency.
3.4.2 Route Level Service Reliability Metrics
Several metrics are available to use when measuring the service reliability benefits of a
bus supervision strategy. These include AVL-provided data measurements such as:
* On-time performance
* Headway consistency
* Terminal departure performance
* Travel time consistency
With a new supervision strategy, benefits can be measured by an increase in on-time
performance, more consistent headways at terminals and at mid-route timepoints, as well
as improvements in travel time consistency. If reliable APC data is available,
improvements can be noted through more consistent bus loads and fewer overcrowding
situations.
At the route level, AVL data measurements can translate directly into headway
consistency at each timepoint, as well as expected and excess passenger waiting times as
calculated by equation 2.1. A beneficial supervision strategy will result in more
consistent headways for high frequency routes which in turn will mean lower excess
passenger waiting times.
Another route level measure is the headway ratio distribution at each timepoint. This
ratio is a measure of the actual observed headway to the scheduled headway for that
particular trip. A headway ratio of 1.0 would indicate a trip operating at its scheduled
headway. Any beneficial supervision strategy will result in a tighter headway ratio
distribution. This means more trips than before will have a ratio of 1.0 and fewer trips
will have headway ratios at the shoulders of the distribution.
3.4.3 Modeling
A simulation model can be used to evaluate the effects of a supervision strategy on
service reliability. By utilizing archived AVL data, a Monte Carlo simulation can be
created to simulate "before and after" scenarios for the proposed supervision strategy.
In a Monte Carlo simulation, the archived AVL data is used to create a simulation of the
bus route in question. Once the simulation is verified to reflect reality, the supervision
strategy can be programmed in to evaluate its effects on the reliability metrics described
above. Data collected for the simulation should span 3-4 weeks so as to capture the full
range of operating conditions.
3.4.4 Experimentation
If the model shows that the proposed supervision strategy could be beneficial, a live, on-
street experimentation can be carried out to verify the model results and better to
ascertain the actual effects of supervision on service reliability.
Data from the experiment should be automatically collected through an AVL system to
obtain the most accurate results. This includes both the experiment period and a "base"
comparison period. The experiment should be run for at least a week to smooth out any
daily variations, and holidays or school vacation days should be avoided. Finally, a
similar week, perhaps immediately before or after the experiment week, should be used
as a "base week" for comparison.
Once the data has been collected during the experiment and base periods, the metrics
described earlier can be used to determine if there has been an improvement in service
reliability during the experimental period.
4 Chicago Transit Authority Case Study
This chapter applies the framework described in chapter 3 to the Chicago Transit
Authority. Section 4.1 assesses the current resources available for bus supervisors at the
CTA. Section 4.2 and 4.3 propose system level strategies for supervision given the
current and expected future levels of resources respectively. Section 4.4 presents an
assessment of reliability on one CTA bus route, Route 20, and the final four sections of
the chapter describe an experiment to restructure supervision on Route 20 and interpret
the results.
4.1 Resource Assessment
This section will present an overview of the supervision practices and resources at the
CTA. A general description of the staffing level and deployment plan will be given first.
This will then be followed by a more detailed description of the duties and
responsibilities of each type of supervisor.
4.1 .1 General Overview
In 2005, the CTA had a total of 143 field supervisors in its bus supervision staff. About
71 (49%) supervisors are deployed in the field during any weekday AM or PM peak hour.
Of these 71 supervisors, 28 (39%) are mobile, and 43 are post supervisors on foot (61%).
The field supervisors are supported by five dispatchers in a control center.
As shown in Figure 4-1, the CTA service area is divided into 4 regions - North, West,
Central, and South. Each region is led by a Transportation Manager who is responsible
for his or her staff of mobile and post supervisors. The two digit numbers are the call
signs of patrol areas assigned to mobile supervisors while the dots indicate the locations
of post supervisors.
Figure 4-1 CTA service management regions and supervision locations
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Two-way radios are used by field supervisors to communicate with each other and with
the control center. The primary bus supervisor radio channel carries all general and
targeted announcements from the control center while the secondary channel is used if an
extended conversation is necessary. Supervisors can only communicate with operators
in-person while the control center can communicate with operators by radio.
4.1.2 Control Center Operations
The main function of the control center is to coordinate the response of the field
supervisors to incidents in the field. These "incidents" can include emergencies,
accidents, maintenance issues, or other major delays. The control center's response will
depend on the type of incident but often involves sending a mobile supervisor to the
scene and/or alerting post supervisors who will be passed by the reporting vehicle.
On the bus side, the control center is staffed by five dispatchers during the peak shift
periods. Four (4) of the dispatchers are referred to as "garage dispatchers" or "monitors"
who are responsible for communicating with operators based in one of their two assigned
garages. The other dispatcher, referred to as the "Cl" controller, manages the bus
supervisor channel radio traffic, relays information to supervisors, assigns reported
service problems to specific supervisors, and records information provided by supervisors
in the Orbital Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system.
Incidents are reported by operators over CTA's CAD system, Orbital Bus Emergency
Communications System (BECS). This system gives operators a menu of canned text
messages to send to the control center to alert them of their problem and the option of a
"request to talk" if voice communications becomes necessary. A silent alarm is also
available to operators who need to contact the control center discreetly. These text
messages go into the event queue of the garage dispatcher responsible for the operator. If
necessary, the garage dispatcher will open a voice channel with the operator to collect
more information such as location, incident severity, and the exact nature of the incident.
Once a response is formulated, the garage dispatcher will forward this event to the Cl
controller. The Cl controller then announces the event over the radio, assigning a
specific supervisor and providing information as needed.
Incidents can also come into the control center through other means such as by telephone.
Garage clerks will call their garage dispatcher to report held-in or delayed runs. Runs
held-in are broadcast on the bus supervisor channel so that field supervisors can take
action to space their street if affected. Late pull-outs are put back on schedule by the
garage or told to see a supervisor to be "put in place". The C controller will then notify
the affected supervisors. In-service operators will also call control if the on-board CAD
mobile data terminal (MDT) is not transmitting properly.
Overall, the control center has little problem processing all of the incidents. Event
queues can sometimes build up during the peak hours, but rarely are any events left open.
The major limitation faced by dispatchers is a lack of reliable communications capacity,
which directly affects their ability to disseminate information in a timely manner. The
lack of real-time AVL information also hampers their ability to quickly locate and detect
incidents and delays.
4.1.3 Mobile Supervisors
Mobile supervisors are primarily responsible for fulfilling assignments in their service
area as assigned by the Cl controller. They are equipped with a sport utility vehicle and
a two-way radio for communicating with the control center and other field supervisors.
Given their mobility, mobile supervisors are typically the first to respond to reports of
standing buses and accidents. According to the CTA they "can often address problems
with transmissions, generator lights, fare boxes...to prevent a tow". When being
dispatched to an accident, mobile supervisors become the initial incident commanders
and can act as the CTA's representative to authorities. Mobile supervisors are also able
to ensure that customers are served and can provide support to the operator.
When not responding to an incident, mobile supervisors will stand at a timepoint of their
choice to check service. They have a supervisor's guide, a complete schedule for each
route, and can verify the schedule adherence and spacing of runs passing their location.
If a bus is running early, the supervisor can hold it or if a bus is running late, the
supervisor can express or short turn it to get it back on schedule.
A breakdown of the time spent on a sample duty for a mobile supervisor is shown in
Table 4-1. This data was gathered during the author's ride-along with a mobile
supervisor in July 2005.
Table 4-1 E - July 2005
One of the biggest hurdles mobile supervisors currently face is a lack of real-time
information. This prevents them from being able to quickly locate moving buses that
need their help such as those with broken fareboxes or silent alarms. It also prevents
them from being able to manage existing service when responding to an incident or when
performing a service check.
4.1.4 Post Supervisors
Post supervisors are mainly responsible for monitoring service at their location and
restoring service when they detect a problem or under instructions from the control
center. They are equipped with a two-way radio for communications and a supervisor's
guide detailing the schedule of runs passing their location.
· · ·
In addition to monitoring service, post supervisor duties involve trouble-shooting
defective equipment, enforcing operational and safety procedures, and mentoring and
supporting operators. Being on foot, post supervisors are also recognizable CTA
representatives who assist customers as necessary.
As shown in Table 4-2, post supervisors spend most of their time monitoring service.
This task involves noting what time each bus passes as well as the number of passengers
on board and the bus identification number. If a bus is running early, the supervisor can
hold it or if a bus is running late, the supervisor can express or short turn it to get it back
on schedule.
Table 4-2 Breakdown of duties for one ost supervisor PM peak shift - July 2005
Time
Acti~ty (Minutes) Percent
Relief Management 20 8%
Administrative 20 8%
Sece Restortion 30 13%
Defective Bus Repair 60 25%
Service Check 110 46%
During the course of monitoring service, post supervisors often assist operators with
equipment defects. Upon receiving a report of a broken farebox for example, the garage
dispatcher will tell the operator to see a post supervisor stationed along their route. The
Cl controller will then notify the supervisor of the problem and the identification number
of the affected bus. Additionally, operators know where post supervisor are located and
will report equipment problems directly to the supervisor instead of notifying the control
center. When the bus arrives, the post supervisor will try to fix the problem to prevent
service from being pulled off the street.
Another key responsibility of post supervisors is to manage any on-street crew changes or
reliefs at their location. This involves making sure that the relief operator is at the relief
point on time, and that the operator to be relieved will arrive on time to the relief point.
If anything is amiss, the supervisor can take one of two actions according to the CTA Bus
Service Supervisor Workshop (2001) in order to keep service on the street:
* Have relief operator pull out a new bus, or take a bus that is to be pulled in if the
operator to be relieved is running too late
* Have the operator to be relieved operate extra trips if the relief operator fails to
arrive
One of the major limitations on post supervision is the lack of real-time information on
bus locations, headways, and schedule adherence. Post supervisors only know the
service history at their location as they have observed it and cannot anticipate conditions
beyond their visual range.
Communications constraints also pose a limitation on their abilities. As described in
Chapter 2, Barker's (2002) analysis of the CTA's radio system shows how a lack of
communications capacity delays the sharing of information. This is especially true
concerning lower priority messages such as hold-ins, delayed departures from garages
and reported service delays.
4.1.5 Information Resources
Referring to Table 3-1, the CTA information resource is classified at level 2. No real-
time information is available but archived information is available through AVL and
APC systems.
Since real-time information is not in place, field supervisors and control center
dispatchers are only aware of the operational situation by radio broadcasts and their own
visual observations. As described in the previous subsections, this severely limits their
ability to maintain and restore reliable service. These limitations will have implications
on personnel deployment and task assignments and this will be discussed in detail in the
next section.
Archived automatic data collection, however, is in place and this greatly enhances the
CTA's ability to analyze their bus network for service reliability problems. The entire
bus fleet is equipped with an AVL system allowing transportation managers to discover
trends leading to unreliable service such as chronically late terminal departures. Problem
routes can also be identified which can assist in guiding supervision efforts. APC
systems are deployed on a subset of the fleet and can be used to sample load profiles and
other ridership data on specific routes. This information can be useful in determining
where supervisors can be most effective.
4.1.6 Communication Resource
Although the CTA supervision force is equipped with a radio communications system,
reliability and capacity issues keep many needed transmissions off the air. In addition,
the radio system does not provide field supervisors the capability to contact bus operators
directly, and vice versa, relegating their communications to intermittent face-to-face
encounters on the street. These inefficiencies indicate that the CTA communication
resource is classified between level 0 and level 1.
The relative lack of communications resource represents the biggest bottleneck in the
CTA supervision force. Not only does it restrict the coordination of service restoration
techniques, but it also limits information sharing among field supervisors and the control
center. With post supervisors scattered throughout the network, observations of late or
held-in buses happen frequently, but supervisors are unable to share this information with
their colleagues downstream who might otherwise have been able to act and restore
service due to congested radio traffic. Supervisors are also unable to directly
communicate with operators which means that they must wait for the operator to arrive
before instructions are given. The result is that service maintenance and restoration is a
task largely left undone by CTA supervision.
4.2 Strategy Development - Current Resource Level
After completing an assessment it's of supervisory resources, the CTA needs to decide
how to deploy its personnel to make the best use of its supervision staff. In other words,
the CTA needs to examine how it should allocate personnel among control center staff,
mobile supervisors, and post supervisors, given the current levels of information and
communications. Furthermore, the location of post supervisors needs to be prioritized,
and responsibilities distributed among all three positions.
4.2.1 Control Center
Given the lack of automated real-time information in the control center, as well as the
limited communications system, it does not make sense to add more personnel unless the
present staff is overwhelmed, which does not currently seem to be the case. Adding more
garage dispatchers may increase the rate at which events are processed and decrease the
event queue, but the limited radio system and the availability of field supervisors to
respond will continue to limit the effectiveness of the control center in incident response
and delay management.
In terms of responsibilities, the CTA will have to determine the priority of the major tasks
at the control center that compete for radio air time: delay management and incident
response. Clearly, incident response is currently the number one priority as it takes
nearly the entire control center time during the peak hours as noted by Barker (2002).
This means that delay/hold-in announcements are often late and, as a result, ineffective.
A possible way to improve this situation is to move delay management into the field
where it can be acted on more effectively.
Managing delays in the field will still be quite limited due to the resource constraints, but
there is room for improvement. Clerks and transportation managers at the garages need
to take more responsibility of monitoring bus pull-outs and reporting any discrepancies to
field supervisors immediately. This may be able to provide the rest of the supervision
force with timely information regarding delayed pull-outs and hold-ins.
4.2.2 Mobile Supervisors
With the current resource level at the CTA, mobile supervisors are perhaps the most
important part of the CTA supervisory staff. Being in the field, they are able to visually
gather intelligence on the state of operations in real-time, something the control center is
unable to do. Furthermore, they can respond to incidents and delays that are out of reach
for post supervisors. Considering their versatility, it would behoove the CTA to convert
most of the existing post supervisors to mobile supervisors. They are able to do the tasks
currently assigned to most post supervisors, but have the advantage of being mobile. The
reallocation of post supervisors will be discussed later in this section.
By adding more mobile supervisors, the event queue for each supervisor will decrease as
more supervisors are able to shoulder the same load. However, mobile supervisors do not
appear to be overwhelmed at the moment, and their increased numbers will allow the
CTA to give them more responsibility, such as taking full control of on-street reliefs, and
participating in delay management. If the garages are able to provide timely delay
reports, mobile supervisors would be able to respond to the route and re-space the street
as needed. These additional responsibilities are discussed further below.
On-street reliefs
As described in section 4.1.4, on-street reliefs need to be managed by a supervisor if
either the relief operator is a no-show or late, or if the operator to be relieved is running
late. Since these reliefs happen on a regular schedule but not continuously, a mobile
supervisor could go to a relief site during the "relief time window" to help ensure smooth
reliefs. At other times, the supervisor can take on different tasks. By cycling between
relief management and other tasks, the supervisor's time is spent much more effectively
than a post supervisor on relief duty who is unable to leave the post whether or not reliefs
are taking place.
Delay management
Due to the lack of real-time AVL information at the control center, it is up to operators to
report delays of 10 minutes or greater, and field supervisors to monitor service and
communicate directly (face-to-face) with operators in order to restore and maintain
reliable service. Service monitoring alone will not be able to detect minor service
disruptions, but delays emanating from incidents and late pull-outs, if broadcast over the
radio in a timely fashion, can be addressed.
Currently when an incident occurs, C1 broadcasts the route, run number, location and
nature of the incident to all supervisors. A mobile supervisor is assigned to respond to
the scene of the incident while post supervisors along the route take notice so they can
monitor and restore service as necessary. However post supervisors are not always in a
good position to restore service such as at a terminal or other posts where passenger loads
are light: mobile supervisors are likely to be more effective. While one supervisor
responds to the actual incident, another one can set up at the terminal to deal with the
missing service. Figure 4-2 depicts this situation on a hypothetical bus route.
Figure 4-2 Mobile supervisor incident response and service restoration
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Similarly, a mobile supervisor can respond to timely late pull-out and hold-in
announcements by repositioning to the terminal or pull out point quickly to re-space the
street and restore service.
To summarize, mobile supervisors are a versatile force and fill an important role given
the CTA's current levels of information and communications resources. Being in the
field, they can gather more "operational intelligence" than the control center and act on it
to keep service reliable. These supervisors can quickly move from point to point, taking
care of occasional problems that do not require a full time supervisory presence -
problems such as standing buses (typically due to a disturbance, accident, or equipment
defect) on-street reliefs and occasional delay management.
4.2.3 Post Supervisors
From the description of the mobile supervisors, it may appear that the job of the post
supervisor is largely redundant. Just about every task a post supervisor performs -
service monitoring, service restoration, and relief management - can be done as well, or
better, by a mobile supervisor, and they can do these tasks at multiple points over the
course of a day. Furthermore, the state of supervisory resources at the CTA usually
means that post supervisors are relegated to monitoring service since they do not have the
information or communications necessary to maintain reliable service. If relief
management duties are shifted to the mobile supervisors, this leaves even less for the post
supervisors to do given their current deployment.
Post supervisors, however, do have a couple of advantages over their mobile
counterparts. Being on foot and out on the street, post supervisors are much more
accessible to the public and to the bus operators. This gives them the ability to provide
customer service and to mentor operators. This can be valuable, especially in places
where customers may need more assistance, such as at a transfer point, or when there are
many new operators who may need guidance. Being on foot also requires post
supervisors to stay in one area which may be effective at terminals that may require
constant supervision. They can focus all of their attention on managing the routes
passing through their location.
Should on-street relief management prove too problematic for mobile supervisors, than
post supervisors will be needed to do this task. Under the current communications
system, mobile supervisors may not find out about a relief problem for some time due to
delays associated with operators reporting the missed relief to the control center, the
control center notifying supervisors, and then mobile supervisors taking time to respond
to the location or find a replacement bus. Post supervisors stationed at the relief point,
however, will know of a problem immediately and can usually marshal buses and
operators at their location who would normally be pulling-in or are on another route for
relief substitution.
It should be recognized that post supervisors can be an effective part of the supervision
force if they are given appropriate responsibilities, placed in the right locations, and
supplied with the best information given the state of resources.
Location
The location of a post supervisor will determine how effective they can be in contributing
towards reliable service. Some locations, such as major terminals, offer the best
opportunities to restore service, and to see as many customers and operators as possible.
Mid-route locations may not lend themselves to service restoration but may allow
supervisors to monitor more routes than at terminals, and to also manage on-street reliefs
and "fallbacks" or breaks if they occur often enough to warrant full-time supervision (if
they do not occur as often, a mobile supervisor could be assigned).
Of the 43 peak period post supervisor positions, 10-20 of them should probably remain at
the major terminals and transfer points, while the rest (23-33) are converted to mobile
supervisors or control center dispatchers. This number may be on the conservative side
and could even be reduced further considering the versatility of mobile supervisors versus
the lack of a well-defined role for post supervisors due to the existing limited resources at
the CTA.
Responsibilities
If the mobile supervisors are going to take on the management of on-street reliefs and
other similar tasks, post supervisors could be concentrated at the major terminals to focus
on customer service, assist in maintaining on-time terminal departures, and manage
reliefs and delays.
4.3 Strategy Development - Future Resource Level
As the CTA looks to improve its level of communications and information, the
supervision deployment strategy should evolve in order to take advantage of the resulting
greater capabilities.
Currently, the CTA is piloting a project that would bring real-time AVL information on
one route to the control center. Additionally, an improved computer aided dispatch
(CAD) system is being tested that reports schedule adherence, pullout status, and allows
direct text messaging between dispatchers and operators. These improvements in
information and communications will clearly have implications for the way supervisors
are deployed. This section will discuss these implications as they pertain to personnel
deployment at the control center, and in the field.
4.3.1 Control Center
With the addition of real-time information and direct text communications between
dispatchers and operators, the control center will have the information it needs to manage
service beyond incident response as well as the communication means to act on it. The
personnel requirements, however, will rise significantly as more dispatchers will be
needed to monitor the real-time AVL information and communicate instructions to
operators.
In the current pilot project, real-time AVL information is displayed graphically as shown
in Figure 4-3. In order for a dispatcher to effectively monitor headways and schedule
adherence, full attention must be paid to individual bus icons looking for signs of service
unreliability such as long headways or late buses. These bus icons are color coded to
indicate on-time, late, early, no-route, and off-route status. This effort can be quite
consuming and would require a large number of dispatchers to monitor all 1700+ peak-
hour buses. If a dispatcher is able to handle 50 buses, a reasonable number as determined
from the experiment experience described in section 4.5, then 40 extra dispatchers would
be required, a number that is unsustainable due to the physical space requirements and
the desire to reduce overall personnel requirements.
If, however, the monitoring of the buses could be automated and the real-time AVL
information system used to generate exception based flags, dispatchers would only have
to be concerned with noting the exceptions and communicating the correct service
restoration techniques to the operators affected. For example, exception flags indicating
a long headway could trigger a "slow down and hold" text message from the control
center to operators in front of the gap. Similarly, exception flags indicating early buses
could trigger a "slow down" text message to operators running ahead of schedule or too
close to its leader. This could allow dispatchers to focus on perhaps 5 to 10 times as
many buses each, if not more, reducing the number of additional dispatchers to as low as
four.
Exception flags could also be used in the form of an automated dispatch system at
terminals to indicate to operators - and customers - when the bus should be departing.
Much like a ring-off bell used in some subway systems, this system should be able to
improve on-time departures and improve headway consistency by adjusting the schedule
based on current conditions.
In the mean time, excess post supervisors, as described below, can be shifted into the
control center to take up roles as dispatchers.
4.3.2 Field Supervisors
As the control center assumes more control over headway and schedule management,
fewer field supervisors will be needed to do this task. Real-time AVL information will
allow service monitoring to be conducted centrally, and direct communications between
the control center and operators will allow service restoration to be directed centrally.
Incident response, however, will still require mobile supervisors.
The number of mobile supervisors will depend on the number of incidents that occur
during a given time period and the desired response time. An increase in incidents and/or
a decrease in desired response time would require more mobile supervisors. This number
though will be lower in the advanced resource state than the current resource state as
fewer supervisors are needed for delay management and service monitoring.
Post supervisors will be needed even less in the advanced resource state. Their two
primary tasks - service monitoring and service restoration - are now housed in the
control center. Instead, post supervisors can be placed at major terminals or transfer
points where the CTA feels constant supervision is necessary. This can be due to
customer service issues, maintenance issues, relief management or other issues requiring
a constant supervision presence. As more headway management personnel are needed in
the control center, post supervisors who have field experience with managing service can
be shifted to the control center to fill the now pressing need for dispatchers described
earlier. However, once the service restoration actions and instructions are clearly defined
and automatic information processing and communications are available in the
CAD/AVL system, personnel requirements in the control center may be reduced or
shifted again into developing, updating, and maintaining decision support tools.
4.3.3 Application and Evaluation of Future Resource Level
Since the CTA has just begun to increase the resource levels on one route (Route 20
Madison), the rest of the framework will be applied to this route to evaluate the
effectiveness of this proposed system-wide supervision deployment strategy. The route
level evaluation will consist of an experiment and model that simulates the future
resource level described above by using current temporarily assigned personnel resources
as a proxy for better information and communication. This simulation is not
representative of a long-term strategy for the current resource level, but only a simulation
of the expected future resource level. The next few sections will review a reliability
assessment of the route, followed by a detailed supervision strategy development. The
rest of the chapter will then detail the results of the evaluation and summarize this case
study.
4.4 Route Level Reliability Assessment
This section presents the reliability assessment portion of the framework described in
Chapter 3 to the CTA Route 20. While the previous section reviewed the CTA
supervision state of the practice system-wide, this section will focus on the following:
* Description of Route 20 - route characteristics and demand profile
* The current state of Route 20 - AVL data analysis outlining the symptoms and
probable causes of service unreliability
4.4.1 Description of Route 20 Madison
For this case study, all data and descriptions refer to the eastbound portion of Route 20 in
the AM peak unless otherwise noted. The westbound portion of the route is addressed
where relevant. Demand data is based on Schwarcz (2004) and refers to November 2003.
Her study period (7:00 AM - 9:15 AM) coincides closely with the study period here (7:25
AM - 9:15 AM).
In the AM peak, Route 20 runs east-west along Madison Avenue from its western
terminal at Austin to its eastern terminal at Columbus/Randolph in the Chicago Loop.
Due to the one way streets downtown, Route 20 eastbound east of Halsted runs on
Washington Street. Heading west, Route 20 runs on Madison Avenue from Michigan
Avenue. Figure 4-4 shows the alignment and boarding and alighting counts for Route 20.
The CTA has established 8 timepoints along the route. It is at these points where
headway and schedule adherence data is sampled for the analysis of the route. Table 4-3
summarizes the key timepoints analyzed in this thesis.
Table 4-3 Key timepoint information
Distance from
preceding timepoint
(miles)
Scheduled travel
time from preceding
timepoint (minutes)
1.5
9.0
1.0
7.0
1.0
6.0
2.0
11.0
1.0
7.0
1.3
13.0
0.6
7.0
8.4
60.0
I
At the CTA, timepoints serve as mid-route checkpoints where operators are able to
determine their schedule adherence. If they are ahead of schedule, operators are
instructed to lose time so that they are back on time by the next timepoint.
Passenger demand for Route 20 is characterized by two peak load points - one just west
of Kedzie, and the other at Halsted. The load profile which was measured over three AM
peak periods from November 17-19, 2003 is shown in Figure 4-5. On the y-axis is the
cumulative observed load and on the x-axis are the key timepoints from west to east.
Figure 4-5 Route 20 demand profile
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Most of the drop in load at Kedzie can be attributed to two schools in the vicinity. Lower
passenger activity between Kedzie and Ashland is a reflection of the relatively low
densities in this area. Loads build up again between Ashland and Halsted along a new
residential and mixed use corridor until the Metra commuter rail station when passengers
begin to alight in the Loop.
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4.4.2 Route 20 Reliability Analysis
This portion of the chapter will describe the current state of service reliability for Route
20. Schedule adherence at Austin and headway regularity along the route will be
presented to demonstrate current service reliability conditions and to develop the basis for
the proposed supervision strategy.
Eleven eastbound trips that are scheduled to depart Austin between 7:25 and 8:15 AM
were chosen for this analysis. Their schedule and recovery time information is shown in
Table 4-4. Six of them complete a full westbound trip prior to their studied eastbound
trip while the other five pull directly out of the garage. Given their 60 minute travel time,
they are scheduled to reach Columbus between 8:25 AM and 9:15 AM. Four weeks of
AVL data from February-March 2006 is used for this analysis.
Table 4-4 Route 20 trips included in analysis
Scheduled Arrival Recovery TimeRun Prior Westbound Trip atcovery m
5058 725 825 Garage Pullout 3 minutes
5001 730 830 Full trip from the Loop 7.5 minutes
5073 735 835 Garage Pullout 3 minutes
5052 740 840 Full trip from the Loop 7.5 minutes
5055 745 845 Garage Pullout 3 minutes
5053 750 850 Full trip from the Loop 7.5 minutes
5009 755 855 Garage Pullout 3 minutes
5014 800 900 Full trip from the Loop 9.5 minutes
5071 805 905 Full trip from the Loop 7.5 minutes
5074 810 910 Full trip from the Loop 5.5 minutes
5010 815 915 Garage Pullout 3 minutes
Measures of Headway Regularity
Service reliability on Route 20 is best measured by headway regularity at the key
timepoints since with scheduled 5 minute headways this is a high frequency route. For
this type of route passengers tend not to use a timetable, and to them, headway regularity
is much more important than schedule adherence when waiting for a bus.
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Two metrics will be used in the discussion of headway regularity - the headway ratio
distribution and the coefficient of variation for headway at each timepoint. The headway
ratio is the observed headway divided by the scheduled headway. Headway ratios less
than one indicate a headway that is less than scheduled, while headway ratios greater than
one indicate a headway greater than scheduled. For example, if a bus has an 8 minute
preceding headway, and its scheduled headway is 5 minutes, then its headway ratio
would be 1.6. This analysis will present the distribution of headway ratios at each
timepoint. With perfectly regular service all trips observed at each timepoint would have
a headway ratio of 1.0. This ideal distribution would result in a mean headway ratio of
1.0, and a standard deviation of 0.
The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation of headway divided by
the mean scheduled headway. This value is measured at each timepoint and is positive
with a higher value indicating a more dispersed distribution. Ideally, the coefficient of
variation at each timepoint would be 0, indicating deterministic headways.
The Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual (TCRP Report 100) has established
level of service grades based on the coefficient of variation of headways and the
probability of bunched buses as shown in Table 4-5. As the coefficient of variation
increases, the probability of bunched buses also increases, and the level of service
deteriorates.
Table 4-5 Transit level of service by headway regularity
LeVel of Coeffcient of Buriching
Service Variation of Headway Probability Comments
A 0.00 - 0.21 < 1% Service provided like clockwork
B 0.22 - 0.30 5 10% Vehicles slightly off headway
C 0.31 - 0.39 5 20% Vehicles often off headway
D 0.40 - 0.52 < 33% Irregular headways, with some bunching
E 0.53 - 0.74 5 50% Frequent bunching
F 2 0.74 > 50% Most vehicles bunched
From the coefficient of variation, two more measures of service reliability - expected
passenger waiting time and excess passenger waiting time - can be calculated (Welding,
1957). The expected passenger waiting time is half the scheduled headway for perfectly
regular high frequency routes where passengers are assumed to arrive randomly. This
value increases as headway variability increases and is calculated as follows:
-h
w = -[1+ cov 2 (h)J (4.1)
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Excess passenger waiting time is the difference between the actual expected waiting time
and the expected waiting time if headways were as scheduled (coefficient of variation =
0) and is calculated as follows:
-h
EWT = w- [1+cov2 (h, 3  (4.2)
where w is the actual expected passenger waiting time, h is the mean scheduled
headway, and cov(h) is the square of the coefficient of variation of the scheduled
headway (Welding, 1957).
Analysis Results
The first step in examining headway regularity on Route 20 is to look at the schedule
adherence of departures at the Austin terminal. As shown in Figure 4-6, just under half
of the trips leave within one minute of their scheduled departure time while the rest are
distributed between 2 to 6 minutes late. During this four-week period, no trips were
observed to leave early.
Figure 4-6 Austin schedule adherence
The observed schedule deviations at Austin translate directly into headway variability. If
all trips were to leave on time, or even if all trips were to leave 3 minutes late, then there
would no variability in the headways at Austin. However, should some trips leave on
time while other trips leave late (or early), then the departing headways will be irregular.
Figure 4-7 shows the headway variation at Austin (as well as at other timepoints
downstream) in the form of a histogram of observed headway ratios. About 65% of the
trips have an observed headway ratio between 0.8 and 1.2 and 10% of trips leave Austin
either bunched (headway ratio less than or equal to 0.4) or with a large gap (headway
ratio greater than or equal to 1.6). The primary reason for this headway variation at
Austin can be traced to the fact that some trips leave on time while others leave late.
As buses travel along the route, service reliability progressively deteriorates. As shown
in Figure 4-7, at each timepoint east of Austin fewer and fewer trips operate with
headway ratios between 0.8 and 1.2 while more and more trips operate at headway ratios
that indicate either bunching or large gaps.
Figure 4-7 Headway variation at Austin,, Pulaski, Ashland, and Halsted
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By the time service reaches Ashland, less than 40% of trips are operating at or near their
scheduled headway while over 20% of trips could be considered bunched and another
15% are operating with large service gaps. This is important because Ashland is directly
upstream of the second segment of heavy boardings as seen in Figure 4-2. A large
number of passengers board Route 20 downstream of Ashland and will be subjected to
the service unreliability being observed between Ashland and Halsted.
As headways become more erratic downstream from Austin, the coefficient of variation
of these headways increases as shown in Figure 4-8, where the coefficient of variation at
Austin is 0.36 and climbs to just over 0.6 at Ashland. By the time service reaches the
Loop, the coefficient of variation is approaching 0.8. From the Transit Capacity and
Quality of Service Manual level of service guide in Table 4-6, Route 20 starts off at
Austin at the 'C' level and quickly reaches level of service 'E' by Kedzie.
Figure 4-8 Coefficient of variation of headways and level of service at each timepoint
As headway variability increases, so does excess passenger waiting time. If operating as
scheduled, passengers wanting to board Route 20 are expected to wait 2.5 minutes on
average - half the scheduled 5 minute headway. However, the variation in headways at
each timepoint leads to increasing excess passenger waiting times as shown in Figure 4-9.
The percentages next to the bars indicate the proportion of the excess passenger waiting
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time compared to the scheduled passenger waiting time of 2.5 minutes. For example,
passengers waiting for Route 20 at Ashland are spending 60% more time on average then
they would if Route 20 were perfectly reliable.
Figure 4-9 Excess passenger waiting times at each timepoint
The analysis so far has shown that Route 20 eastbound trips begin with a moderate
degree of unreliability at Austin but service quickly deteriorates downstream. The
variation in terminal departures at Austin will now be examined as a possible cause for
unreliability throughout the route. Referring to the literature review in Chapter 2,
Cham's (2005) analysis of the MBTA's Silver Line demonstrated how bunched and
gapped terminal departures have little chance of achieving their scheduled headway in the
middle of the route. This same phenomenon also holds true for route 20.
In order to find out what was actually occurring on Route 20, the headway for each trip at
Austin and at another timepoint downstream were compared. The output becomes a chart
showing the probability of a headway ratio downstream given an initial headway ratio at
Austin.
Looking at Figure 4-10, trips that begin at Austin with a headway ratio of less than or
equal to 0.4, or greater than 1.6 were virtually never able to achieve their scheduled
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headway by Pulaski. As expected, trips that started on their scheduled headway at Austin
had the highest probability of making their scheduled headway at Pulaski.
Figure 4-10 Headway ratio probability at Pulaski by initial headway ratio at Austin
As noted earlier, service reliability deteriorates as buses traverse the route. In Figure 4-
11, this trend is evident at Ashland, where no trip has more than a 50% probability of
making its scheduled headway no matter the initial situation at Austin. It is worth noting
that trips leaving Austin with a headway ratio of less than 0.4 have nearly a 60%
probability of remaining bunched at Ashland while trips leaving Austin with a headway
ratio of greater than 1.6 have a similar probability of remaining gapped.
Overall, it is those trips that are departing Austin with extreme headway ratios that have
the least chance of achieving their scheduled headway downstream. Trips with more
moderate initial headway ratios (greater than 0.4 and less than 1.6) stood the best chance
of keeping their scheduled headway downstream.
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This set of analysis clearly shows the importance of disciplined terminal departures on
reliability downstream. It is imperative that operators begin their trips on their scheduled
headways in order to have the best chance of maintaining headway regularity
downstream.
Another possible cause of service unreliability on Route 20 is travel time variation.
Figure 4-12 shows the mean observed and scheduled travel time between timepoints as
well as the observed travel time plus and minus one standard deviation. Travel times are
fairly consistent throughout the route and are nearly identical to the scheduled travel
times. This leads to the conclusion that the schedule is not the primary cause of service
unreliability. However there is enough variation to cause service reliability to deteriorate.
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Figure 4-12 Mean observed timepoint travel times and standard deviation
Summary
While variations in travel times may cause service reliability to degrade downstream, it is
clear that the primary cause of service unreliability stems from the lack of uniformity in
terminal departure headways. Right out of the terminal, Route 20 is shown to have a
moderate degree of variability in headways that only gets worse downstream. The data
then plainly shows how bunched and gapped terminal departures have virtually no chance
of achieving their scheduled headway anytime downstream. It is those trips that start out
on, or close to, their schedule headway that have the highest chance of maintaining
reliable service throughout the route.
It is worth noting however that there is still a substantial buildup of travel time variability
along the route. Fixing the terminal departure discipline at Austin will not fix the service
reliability problems at Ashland, as Figure 4-9 illustrates.
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4.5 Development of a Supervision Strategy
This section outlines the development of an experimental bus supervision strategy based
upon the current resources available, and the reliability conditions of Route 20. The
purpose of this experiment is not to find a strategy that fits the current resources, but
rather to simulate a future resource state and develop a strategy that could take advantage
of real-time AVL information, and improved communications. The actual recommended
deployment strategy will come about after an analysis of the experiment.
4.5.1 Goals of the Supervision Strategy
Part of any supervision strategy that is applied to Route 20 should aim to bring
uniformity to terminal departure headways. This will not only benefit passengers waiting
for a bus near Austin, but will also benefit all passengers waiting downstream as shown
in the analysis. The strategy should also account for Route 20's load profile (see Figure
4-4). A high number of boardings occur between Austin and Kedzie, and then again
between Ashland and Halsted. While service reliability may be at its lowest between
Halsted and Michigan, it would make no sense to take any action here because few
passengers board within the Loop (short turning could be a beneficial action depending
on the bus loads the severity of bus bunching but for this experiment, short turning will
not be an option). It would make sense however to take action at Austin and at Ashland
as these are the timepoints just upstream of the major boarding zones.
With this in mind, it is proposed that one post supervisor each be deployed at Austin,
Pulaski, Kedzie, and Ashland. These post supervisors will simulate the effect of the
control center having direct communications with the operator by relaying control center
requests to the operator during the experiment. In the actual "high resource state"
deployment, these post supervisors would not have a role as the task would be the
complete responsibility of the control center. Since real-time AVL information is
available to the control center dispatcher, it is proposed that the dispatcher monitor
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service along the entire route and notify post supervisors of recommended actions. Table
4-6 summarizes the resources available for Route 20.
Table 4-6 Route 20 Supervision resource availability
Resource Type Availability
Street supervisors at Pulaski, Kedzie, and Ashland. One mobile supervisor
Personnel along the Madison corridor who is stationed at Austin. One dedicated
dispatcher at the Central Control.
Real-time AVL data at Central Control, supervisor guide. Knowledge ofInformation
immediate surroundings (traffic, vehicle status, etc.) from street supervisors.
Cell phone communications between dispatcher and the supervisors. No
Communications direct contact with bus operators. Supervisors may contact each other.
Supervisors may contact operators only in person.
Placing a supervisor at Austin will give the dispatcher the ability to re-space the terminal
if any large delays arise. The supervisor will also be able to enforce the scheduled
departure headway under normal operating conditions. At Pulaski, the supervisor will
serve to help the dispatcher verify the real-time AVL information by being the eyes and
ears on the street, rather than performing operations control due to the load profile of
Route 20. The Pulaski supervisor is in a position to verify the pull-outs where as the
other supervisors are not. At Kedzie, the supervisor will serve as the first control point
prior to the Ashland-Halsted boarding zone. Relatively few passengers are on board the
buses at Kedzie, so this makes it a good control point. The Ashland supervisor represents
the last control point prior to the second major boarding zone. This supervisor will be
responsible for holding buses as instructed by the dispatcher to promote even headways.
Ordinarily, not all of these resources are available for Route 20. For the purposes of this
research and experiment, extra resources have been added. These resources will only be
in place for the experiment, and not for the long run. In practice, there is no dedicated
dispatcher for a single route at the CTA, nor is there a street supervisor at Austin or
Kedzie. The additional resources exist to ensure that the maximum potential of the new
real-time AVL system can be explored and automation techniques can be documented.
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As concluded in the prior analysis, Austin and Ashland are the key timepoints for the
proposed supervision strategy. It is at these points where headway regularity will be
promoted through bus supervision actions.
4.5.2 Responsibilities of the Control Center Dispatcher
With real-time AVL data available only at the control center, the decision making powers
regarding the route must lie here. The dispatcher's primary responsibility will be to
monitor vehicle locations on Route 20 during the study period in order to detect service
gaps and bus bunching. If any conditions are detected that may lead to unreliable service,
the dispatcher will decide on what action, if any, should be taken and will call the
appropriate supervisor to execute the action.
The only operations control strategies available for the experiment are:
* Holding
* Running slow or "dragging the street"
* Move up runs at Austin
Expressing was taken off the table because the CTA did not want to irritate any
passengers who would be passed up by the expressed run. Short turning was an available
option but would be used only in the most extreme circumstances due to the
inconvenience costs to passengers onboard the short turned bus and the amount of time
and effort it takes to short turn a bus.
4.5.3 Austin Supervisor Responsibilities
The Austin supervisor's main objective is to maintain the scheduled headway for buses
beginning their eastbound trips. At times, this may mean spacing back or moving up
buses to compensate for any westbound trips that may be late arriving at the terminal.
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Without the real-time ALV information, the Austin supervisor will be able to properly
space bunched buses but will not be able to detect incoming service gaps. As covered in
chapter 2, post supervisors are only able to detect a service gap when they notice a bus is
late arriving at their location. By the time this happens, the buses in front of the gap will
have left the terminal and the supervisor will be unable to hold them and split the gap.
However, real-time AVL information is available to the dispatcher at the control center.
If the dispatcher notices a missing or delayed westbound run, he will be responsible for
contacting the Austin supervisor and advising her on how to space her terminal. The
overarching objective will be to break up bus bunches at the terminal and spread large
service gaps (headway ratios greater than 1.2) across multiple runs when possible. Figure
4-13 shows a flowchart depicting the process for the control center-Austin supervisor
relationship.
The appropriate actions will be either to hold runs in front of a gap, executing Turnquist's
(1982) "Prefol" strategy, or to move up runs already at the terminal to fill a gap from
behind. Expressing buses or deadheading to fill a gap were options that were taken off
the table due to their perceived cost to downstream passengers being passed up.
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Figure 4-13 Decision flow chart for Austin
Austin on appropriate action
4.5.4 Pulaski Supervisor Responsibilities
The Pulaski supervisor is in a unique position - one that is able to meet operators pulling
directly out of the Chicago Avenue garage but unable to perform any beneficial operation
control moves due to the Route 20 load profile. According to the historic data, eastbound
buses passing Pulaski will be quite full while relatively few people will be waiting to
board immediately downstream (see Figure 4-4).
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However, the ability to meet operators pulling out of the garage will be of great aid to the
experiment. Five of the eleven eastbound trips included in the experiment, as shown in
Table 4-4, pull directly out of the garage. Figure 4-14 shows their pull-out route
beginning at the Chicago Avenue garage, heading south on Pulaski and then finally
heading westbound on Madison before making their first eastbound trip from the Austin
terminal. If the real-time AVL system is showing a run missing, a call to the Pulaski
supervisor can confirm this. Another call can then be made to the Austin supervisor to
space the terminal if necessary.
Figure 4-14 Location of Chicago Avenue Garage and Pulaski Supervisor
Garage
Austin E X
Terminal
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Pulaski
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A = PulasK1 PSupervisor
4.5.5 Kedzie Supervisor Responsibilities
The Kedzie supervisor will act as the first mid-route control point. Normally, a mid-route
post supervisor has no information on service gaps upstream of their position as
described in Chapter 3. During the experiment however, the dispatcher will be able to
monitor runs coming into Kedzie for signs of a gap forming. If a run has a following
headway of 7 minutes or more and a preceding headway of 5 minutes or less, the
dispatcher will instruct the Kedzie supervisor to have the run "drag the street" until
Ashland to lose about 2 minutes along the way. If 2 minutes is not enough to split the
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gap, the dispatcher would instruct Kedzie to hold the bus 1-2 minutes maximum in
addition. Holding a bus mid-route even at the lowest load point is an action of last resort
because passengers on board may get irritated. Dragging the street is seen as less
irritating since the bus is moving - albeit catching a couple of extra red lights. Again,
expressing is not considered due to the costs to passengers being passed up.
4.5.6 Ashland Supervisor Responsibilities
The Ashland supervisor will represent the last chance to restore even headways before
the major boarding zone between Ashland and Halsted. If the dispatcher was unable to
effectively close a service gap at Kedzie, the Ashland supervisor will be instructed to
hold runs in front of gaps to split the gap. In order to minimize the costs to on board
passengers, holds will be no longer than 2 minutes.
4.5.7 Summary and Expectations of Proposed Supervision Strategy
The proposed strategy encompasses the three major aspects of supervision - information,
personnel, and communications - to determine how effective supervision can be in
improving service reliability.
1) Real-time information will be used by one dedicated dispatcher at the control
center who is responsible for monitoring service on Route 20. Headways of 7
minutes or greater are considered service gaps and are dealt with as described
above..
2) Four post supervisors are deployed along Route 20. Their primary responsibility
is to execute operations control strategies as directed by the dispatcher. These
supervisors will also help corroborate the real-time information by being the
dispatcher's eyes and ears on the street.
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3) Communications between the dispatcher and the four post supervisors will be
handled through cellular phone. This represents a dedicated channel to each
supervisor and between supervisors providing virtually unlimited communications
capacity between all parties.
In essence, the real-time information at the control center combined with extensive
communications gives supervisors access to all the information they need to maintain and
restore service reliability. Furthermore, all decision making is done centrally by the
dispatcher, making the execution of operations control even easier for the post supervisor.
This should lead to much more reliable service on Route 20 as measured by the headway
variation of the eleven eastbound runs in Table 4-4.
4.6 Evaluation - Model Results
As described at the end of section 4.5, the headway variation along Route 20 eastbound is
expected to decrease dramatically due to the headway control at Austin, Kedzie, and
Ashland. In order to test this hypothesis, a model was constructed to simulate the effects
of:
1) Enforcing terminal departure headways of at least 4 minutes (Single-headway
strategy). Note that this is less than the scheduled headway so that buses would
not stack up at Austin and cause excessively late buses. Timetables were still in
use during the experiment and care was taken not to cause undue schedule
disruptions.
2) Holding buses at Austin to split large headways (Prefol strategy).
3) Holding buses at Ashland to split large headways (Prefol strategy).
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The next two subsections will detail the model's inputs and assumptions, and the results
of the model with regard to predicted headway variation at each timepoint after
implementing the proposed supervision strategy.
4.6.1 Model Inputs
A Monte Carlo simulation was created in Microsoft Excel to predict the effects of the
experiment's supervision strategy. Four (4) weeks of archived AVL data from February
and March 2006 was used to extract timepoint-to-timepoint travel time distributions and
Austin departure times for the 11 trips considered in the experiment. The simulator then
recreated the 11 trips based on this distribution to create "one day" of data. Thirty (30)
simulated "days" were run through the simulation model to find the baseline headway
distribution at each timepoint and the headway distribution after implementing the
supervision strategy.
In order to validate the model, the simulated headway distribution at each timepoint was
compared to the actual headway distribution using an F-test two sample for variances
test. The input to the model included timepoint-to-timepoint travel times, so it is not
necessarily true that the headway distribution will be the same. However, the F-test
showed that the standard deviation of the distributions was found to be not significantly
different at each timepoint except for Michigan at the 0.05 level. In other words, the
model successfully recreated the observed reliability conditions.
The proposed supervision strategy was then simulated to generate new headway
distributions. To simulate the supervision strategy, the following logic was added to the
model:
If a run could depart Austin with less than a 4 minute headway in the baseline
scenario, hold it until its preceding headway is 4 minutes.
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If a run's following headway is greater than 5 minutes at Austin or at Ashland in
the baseline scenario, hold to split the gap between the run's leader and the run's
follower - the "Prefol" strategy described in Chapter 2.
One of the major assumptions behind the model is that timepoint-to-timepoint travel
times remain unchanged from the baseline scenario to the supervision scenario. In other
words, it is assumed that a run that was simulated to take 8 minutes to travel from Austin
to Cicero in the baseline scenario would still take 8 minutes in the supervision scenario
whether or not it was held at Austin. This assumption was made because no relationship
could be established between headways and travel times at any point in the route.
4.6.2 Model Results
As expected, the model predicted a drop in headway variation at the two control points,
Austin and Ashland. As shown in Figure 4-15, the initial drop is quite dramatic but
headway variability increases at timepoints downstream as travel time and dwell time
variability begin to take their toll on reliability.
Figure 4-15 Forecast headway variation with the proposed supervision strategy
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This drop in headway variation leads directly to a drop in excess passenger wait times as
shown in Figure 4-16. Again, the effects of the supervision strategy are concentrated at
the first few timepoints following the control point, a result that is consistent with the
experiment described in the literature review involving Tri-Met and their BDS system
(Strathman et al., 2001).
Figure 4-16 Forecast excess passenger wait time for the proposed supervision strategy
At first glance, excess passenger wait times of less than one minute in the baseline
scenario seem small. Even smaller are the excess passenger wait time savings produced
by the supervision strategy, which are on the order of 0.2 to 0.6 minutes. To be
meaningful however, these results should be looked at in terms of a percentage of the
expected scheduled waiting time. Table 4-7 summarizes the excess passenger wait times
as a percentage of the expected scheduled wait time. The baseline scenario results are
presented alongside the supervision scenario results which are in parentheses.
Table 4-7 Excess wait time as a percentage of scheduled wait time
Austin Cicero Pulaski Kedzie Ashland Halsted
Scheduled Expected Wait 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Time
Simulated Expected Wait 2.81 3.01 3.13 3.23 3.37 3.46
Time (2.68) (2.9) (3.06) (3.2) (2.71) (2.94)
S 0.31 0.51 0.63 0.73 0.87 0.96
Simulated Excess Wait Time (0.18) (0.4) (0.56) (0.7) (0.21) (0.44)
Percentage of Scheduled 12.5% 20.3% 25.1% 29.1% 34.9% 38.2%
Expected Wait Time (7.1%) (16.2%) (22.5%) (28%) (8.3%) (17.8%)
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The scheduled expected wait time in Table 4-7 is calculated using equation 4.1 where the
mean headway is 5 minutes and the coefficient of variation is zero. By reducing the
coefficient of variation at each timepoint, the proposed supervision strategy is expected to
reduce excess wait times from 12.5% of the scheduled wait time to 7.1% at Austin. At
Ashland, the effect is even more pronounced with the supervision strategy expected to
reduce excess wait times from 34.9% of the scheduled wait time to only 8.3%.
Another way to look at the results is by examining the resources necessary to produce the
expected wait times at each timepoint. To achieve 5 minute headways on Route 20, the
CTA must deploy 24 buses for the estimated 120 minute cycle time during the AM peak.
According to the model, this deployment gives passengers an expected wait time of 3.4
minutes at Ashland as shown in Table 4-7. Again, this expected wait time factors in a
coefficient of headway variation equal to 0.6 as shown in Figure 4-16. If the CTA were
able to achieve an 0.3 coefficient of headway variation at Ashland with the proposed
supervision strategy, a deployment of only 19 vehicles producing headways of 6.3
minutes would be necessary to give passengers the same expected wait time of 3.4
minutes at Ashland as shown in Table 4-8.
Table 4-8 Effect of reliability on resource assignment
Expected
Cycle Coefficient of Passenger
(min) Vehicles Headway Variation Waiting Time
Baseline Scenaro 120 24 5 0.61 3.4
SSupervion Scenaro 120 19 6.3 0.26 3.4
Of course, this analysis must be taken with a grain of salt. Improving reliability along a
route should not just be looked at as a way to cut costs, but also as a way to improve the
transit experience and hence customer satisfaction and eventually ridership. In addition,
capacity constraints must also be taken into account. Reducing the number of vehicles on
a route may compromise the capacity needed during the AM peak hour. With those
caveats in place, this analysis is still quite powerful in demonstrating the benefits of
improved service reliability, whether from the passenger or transit provider point of view.
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4.6.3 Modeling Summary
The Monte Carlo simulation presented in this section demonstrated that executing both a
single-headway hold strategy and the Prefol hold strategy at Austin and Ashland has the
potential to reduce headway variation and improve reliability. This is achieved by
breaking up bus bunches at both timepoints and by filling in large headway gaps by
holding buses to split the gap. The benefits of holding however are shown to be confined
to the control point and timepoints immediately downstream. This is a reflection of the
fact that traffic conditions and dwell time variability will continue to erode service
reliability despite intensive supervision efforts.
Without real-time AVL information and dedicated communications, the Prefol holding
strategy would not be possible due to the information requirements described in Chapter
2.
4.7 Evaluation - Experiment Results
This section will review the results of the experiment carried out on Route 20 for four
weekdays (Tues-Fri) during the week of April 25-28, 2006. The experiment involved
implementing the proposed supervision strategy described in section 4.5, and then
analyzing data from the CTA BLIS database to evaluate the impacts on service reliability.
During the experiment, numerous runs were held at Austin, Kedzie, and Ashland in order
to break up bus bunches when there was a following headway in excess of 6 minutes.
These holds did not exceed 1-2 minutes. In addition, there were four runs that were
either excessively late pulling out of the garage, or held in altogether. In order to
compensate, the preceding runs of the late or held-in runs were held in accordance to the
Prefol strategy, and the following runs were moved up whenever possible.
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As expected, the coefficient of variation of the headways decreased at each timepoint
when compared to the previous week (April 18-21) as shown in Figure 4-17. The drop in
headway variation at Austin was not as large as predicted in the model, but its effects
reached much farther downstream than predicted.
Figure 4-17 Headway variation before and during the experiment
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The decrease in headway variation ultimately led to a decrease in excess passenger
waiting times as shown in Figure 4-18. Again, the effects of the Austin control point are
not as pronounced at Austin but linger for the entire route. At Ashland, the effect of the
control point was not a reduction in excess waiting time, but likely the prevention of a
spike in headway variation at Halsted which occurred the previous week.
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Figure 4-18 Excess passenger wait time before and during the experiment
As with the model results, the reductions in headway variation and excess passenger wait
times are not as meaningful until looked at as a percentage of the scheduled expected
waiting time. At the Austin control point, excess wait times declined from 22.8% of the
scheduled wait time during the previous week to 14.1% during the experiment week as
shown in Table 4-9. The difference in expected waiting times between the previous week
and the experiment week grows larger at timepoints downstream, indicating that the
effect of the Austin control point, combined with some control at Kedzie and Ashland,
greatly reduced excess passenger waiting times throughout the eastbound portion of
Route 20.
Table 4-9 Excess wait time as a percentage of scheduled wait time
Austin Cicero Pulaski Kedzie Ashland Halsted
Scheduled Expected Wait 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Time
3.07 3.44 3.74 3.96 3.88 4.43
Expected Wait Time (2.85) (3.29) (3.24) (3.34) (3.5) (3.66)
0.57 0.94 1.24 1.46 1.38 1.93
Excess Wait Time (0.35) (0.79) (0.74) (0.84) (1) (1.16)
Percentage of Scheduled 22.8% 37.7% 49.8% 58.4% 55.3% 77.3%
Expected Wait Time (14.1%) (31.7%) (29.7%) (33.5%) (40.1%) (46.4%)
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As noted in Chapter 2, in the Tri-Met BDS experiment the effects of terminal control
lasted for only a short period of time before the prior level of unreliability returned. In
the case of this experiment, it appears that this is not the case. Headway variation and
excess passenger wait times decrease slightly at Austin but do not rebound much at all
compared to the results from the baseline week. One possible explanation is that at
Austin, the extreme headways were drastically cut back (headways less than 2 minutes or
greater than 8 minutes) but the variation around the mean did not decline as shown in
Figure 4-19. Bus bunches were reduced by about half, and large headway gaps were
reduced by about five fold. However, headways in the range of 4-6 minutes did not see a
large increase. This was due to the fact that the real-time AVL system gave advanced
warning to the supervision team of large incoming headways, and supervisors acted on
them, and also that supervisors at the Austin terminal were enforcing the scheduled
headway.
Figure 4-19 Distribution of headways departing Austin
By cutting down on the large headways and bus bunches leaving Austin, more runs had a
higher chance of achieving their scheduled headway downstream as discussed in section
4.2.2. This led directly to more runs with headways between 4-6 minutes downstream
and fewer bunched or gapped runs as shown in Figures 4-20 and 4-21.
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Figure 4-20 Distribution of headways at Pulaski (3rd timepoint from Austin)
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Figure 4-21 Distribution of headways at Kedzie (4 th timepoint from Austin)
70%
4.8 Case Study Summary
In applying the framework presented in Chapter 3, this case study has developed
recommendations for supervision personnel deployment based on current and future
resource levels. Utilizing the CTA's Real-Time Network pilot project as a simulation of
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future resources, an experiment was conducted to evaluate the proposed supervision
strategy. This section presents a summary of the experiment followed by the implications
of the results towards the redeployment of supervision resources at the CTA.
4.8.1 Experiment Summary
This experiment has shown that terminal control through a post supervisor can have a
positive effect on service reliability by enforcing the scheduled departure headway.
Knowing the schedule adherence and location of incoming runs, the terminal supervisor
was able to go a step further and employ the Prefol strategy. The end result was that
many fewer runs departed Austin bunched or with large headways and more runs were
able to maintain their scheduled headway downstream compared to the baseline week.
This in turn produced lower expected waiting times for the bulk of the passengers
boarding between Austin and Kedzie, and again between Ashland and Halsted.
The experiment also revealed the potential impacts of real-time AVL information on
service reliability as well as task and personnel assignment (more on personnel in the
following subsection). With the control center dispatcher fully informed on vehicle
location and headways, more effective operational control decisions could be made and
passed on to the operators via the post supervisors.
The supervision strategy did have two shortcomings with regard to reliability. The first is
that despite having full communications, information, and personnel capability at Austin
and Ashland, supervision was unable to reduce headway variability to zero at these
timepoints. This can be attributed to several factors including:
* The central dispatcher being unable to focus solely on Austin or Ashland
operations. This led to some long headways going undetected until it was too late
to act.
* Missing real-time data. Some runs did not show up on the real-time AVL system
and subsequently could not be tracked.
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Inherent variations in tracking time. It is unrealistic to expect a supervisor to be
able to have each bus leave Austin exactly 5 minutes apart. There are numerous
distractions, including noise, weather, and other tasks that will inevitably cause
departure variations.
At Ashland, there were additional issues that had to be considered. Holding buses longer
than 1 or 2 minutes was unrealistic due to the inconvenience it caused passengers already
on board. Although these buses were at the lowest load point on the route, they were still
typically carrying 15-20 people each. Additionally, if a run's preceding plus following
headway exceeded 10 minutes, then it would be impossible to achieve the scheduled 5
minute headway.
4.8.2 Supervision Deployment
As stated earlier, the experiment in no way represented an actual deployment
recommendation due to the unsustainable amount of resources used to achieve a high
level of communications and operator compliance. It did, however, shed light on the
potential of improved information and communications on increasing service reliability
through the shifting of supervision responsibilities and personnel deployment.
By bringing real-time AVL information into the control center, the dispatcher has full
knowledge of vehicle location, headway, and schedule information and thus is in a better
position to manage service than field supervisors. With improved communications, the
dispatcher can directly instruct operators in an effort to restore and maintain service and
improve reliability, reducing the need for field personnel. This was simulated in the
experiment through the use of cellular phones and post supervisors relaying instructions
to the operators.
Once real-time AVL information becomes available on more routes, the CTA will need
to upgrade its communications upgrade to take advantage of the information upgrade.
Control center dispatchers monitoring service without improved communications will not
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be able to communicate their instructions with operators quickly, and the real-time
information will not be taken advantage of. In addition, the improved communications
will reduce the number of post supervisors as the control center takes on the dual role of
monitoring service and restoring/maintaining service. Some of these post supervisors can
then be moved into the control center to assume dispatcher positions.
As the control center begins to fully assume the tasks of service monitoring and service
restoration, post supervisors will no longer be needed to duplicate these tasks. Instead,
one approach could be to reduce their numbers to 10 or even less, depending on the
priority the CTA places on their customer service, and terminal management (mentoring
operators, performing minor repairs) capabilities. Fewer will be needed if only the
biggest terminals are to be staffed such as 95th/Dan Ryan, Jefferson Park, or locations
within the Loop and more may be needed if there is a need for stationary personnel
elsewhere.
Mobile supervisor numbers can also be reduced as they too will no longer have to
participate in service monitoring or restoration. They will still be responsible for incident
response at the direction of the control center, managing on-street reliefs as they occur
throughout the day, and for performing safety checks on operators as required.
For this strategy to become fully scalable to the entire CTA network, exception based
reporting through automatic information processing will be needed at the control center.
More specifically, headway and schedule adherence monitoring needs to be automated to
give dispatchers only the information they need concerning unreliable service conditions.
Monitoring over 1,700 peak hour buses will require a number of dispatchers unless this
task can be automated. Dispatchers can then focus on the exceptions that require their
attention and can instruct those operators as required. The additional dispatchers required
to respond to the new real-time AVL information can come from the reallocated number
of field positions.
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5 MBTA Case Study
This chapter presents the partial application of the framework described in chapter 3 to
the MBTA Washington Street Silver Line. The first part of the chapter will introduce the
Silver Line, assess the current state of reliability (section 5.1), and the supervision
resources available (section 5.2). The later part of the chapter will propose changes to the
way supervisors are deployed (section 5.3), and then analyze the potential improvements
to service reliability that should result.
5.1 Reliability Assessment
As discussed in the literature review, Cham (2006) completed a thorough reliability
analysis of the Washington Street Silver Line. This section summarizes Cham's findings
for the PM peak period, which was generally found to be most problematic in terms of
running time variability, and headway variation.
5.1.1 Description of the Silver Line
The MBTA's Washington Street Silver Line is a bus rapid transit line running between
downtown Boston and Dudley Square to the southeast. As shown in Figure 5-1, there are
12 stops in each direction providing transfer opportunities to the MBTA's rail rapid
transit lines as well as numerous other bus routes along the route. Buses run on non-
protected exclusive bus lanes through most of Washington Street and in mixed traffic
through downtown.
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The two terminals are at Dudley Square and at Temple Street in downtown. Dudley
Square functions as the main terminal with room for multiple Silver Line buses to
layover. The Temple Street terminal is more a turn around stop, and can hold only two
buses due to the physical layout of the street. Due to this configuration, recovery times at
Temple are less than 4 minutes while at Dudley they can be up to 11 minutes.
During the AM peak, most of the Silver Line passengers are heading inbound toward
Temple Street, while in the PM peak, the reverse is true as shown in Figure 5-2 (Cham,
2006).
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Figure 5-2 Silver Line Passenger Demand Distribution
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Headways range from 5-6 minutes during the peak periods to 12-15 minutes as shown in
Table 5-1 (Cham, 2006).
Table 5-1 Silver Line Schedule
Rush Hour Midday Evening Late Night
Dudley 5 ymins 8 mins 10 mins 12 mins
Square
Temple Place 5 nmins 8 mins 10 mins 12 rmins
5.1.2 Data Analysis
Archived AVL data on the Silver Line was used from May, 2005 to analyze running
times, schedule adherence, and headway variation along the route.
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The AVL data is aggregated at the timepoint level, which for the Silver Line is simply the
individual bus stop, and includes the time a specific vehicle arrives and departs a
timepoint, the vehicle ID number, trip ID number, and other data that makes it possible to
track vehicle movements along the route.
5.1.3 Running Time Analysis
PM peak running times along the Silver Line generally fall within the schedule except for
the inbound trips running from E. Berkeley to Temple. Nearly all of these trips took
longer than scheduled to traverse this section of the route. The variability of running
times of all PM peak trips was noted to be high with standard deviations of running times
calculated in excess of 20% of the mean running time, as shown in Tables 5-2 and 5-3
(Cham, 2006).
Cham notes that the main problem with running time is that it is unpredictable and
inconsistent. Travel time variability also leads to headway adherence problems
propagating along the route.
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5.1.4 Headway Adherence
Similar to Route 20, the Silver Line was found to have the highest headway adherence at
its terminals, with running time and dwell time variability contributing to headway
adherence breaking down mid-route. Figure 5-3 clearly demonstrates this, with over 30%
of trips departing the terminals with their scheduled headway but fewer than 20% of trips
maintain this headway mid-route (Cham, 2006).
Figure 5-3 PM Peak Headway Distribution
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The main cause of unreliable headways was determined to be poor terminal discipline:
sufficient recovery time was available at the Dudley terminal, yet only 35% of trips left
with their scheduled headway. Of the trips leaving Dudley with their scheduled
headway, 47% were found to be operating on schedule at East Berkeley. Of the trips
leaving Dudley with shorter or longer headways, no more than 21% were found to be
operating on schedule. As in the Route 20 case, this highlights the need for good
terminal departure discipline if service is to be reliable downstream.
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5.2 Resource Assessment
The Silver Line, unlike the rest of the MBTA bus network, is rich with supervision
resources. Two post supervisors are stationed along the route, one at Temple, and the
other at Dudley. A dedicated dispatcher is also assigned to the route and has access to
real-time AVL information from his post at the control center. The two post supervisors
and the dispatcher can communicate via a two-way radio.
This level of resources is unique to the Silver Line since it serves as the flagship BRT
route for the MBTA. Scaling them up to the level where the entire network could be
covered, or maintaining this level of personnel for the Silver Line alone is not a viable
option. Instead, a better personnel deployment strategy is required to 1) take advantage
of the available resources on the Silver Line, and 2) allow for personnel reductions as
technology advances.
The post supervisor stationed at Temple Street is focused solely on Silver Line
operations. Observations of the supervisor's activities were taken in December, 2005.
Most of the time, this supervisor could be considered idle, only taking notes on departure
times and occasionally answering customer questions. Every so often however, the
supervisor would have to move private vehicles out of the way on the narrow street so
buses could get through. The fact that this supervisor is dedicated to the Silver Line, and
has few tasks taking his time makes Temple Street a prime location for operations
control.
The other post supervisor is stationed at Dudley Square but must split time between the
Silver Line and the rest of the bus routes that serve the terminal. Observations of the
supervisor's activities were also taken in December, 2005. Unlike the Temple Street
supervisor, the Dudley post was quite busy handling customer questions, operator
concerns, and keeping order at the terminal. The terminal is very busy, with hundreds of
passengers passing through during the PM peak. With such a large volume of other tasks
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to handle, operations control at Dudley is not as feasible for this supervisor when
compared to the Temple supervisor.
At the control center, a dedicated Silver Line dispatcher watches over the route using
real-time AVL information. The location and schedule adherences of all buses are
known to the dispatcher but as of January 2006, none of this information is used for
operations control.
5.3 Development of the Supervision Strategy
Cham's (2006) analysis of the Washington Street Silver Line found that the route was
experiencing poor departure headway ratios at the terminals, leading to worse reliability
conditions downstream. One possible solution to this problem would be to have
supervisors at each terminal enforce the scheduled headway by holding buses to their
headway. Buses could also be held longer to split large headway gaps as Turnquist
(1981) suggests with the Prefol strategy.
This type of holding strategy, as discussed in the prior chapters, is proactive and would
require a supervisor to have real-time information on bus locations as well as the ability
to communicate any instructions to the operators. The feasibility of executing this
strategy on the Silver Line will be discussed in the next subsection covering supervision
resources for the route.
5.3.1 Proposed Supervision Strategy
a) Existing Resources
From Cham's (2006) analysis presented in section 5.1, terminal departure discipline was
found to be the most important element in promoting reliable bus service along the route.
Therefore, for any supervision strategy to be successful at improving reliability, terminal
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departures must be the focus. Good departure discipline will not only benefit passengers
waiting at the terminal, but will also benefit those waiting downstream by providing more
consistent headways throughout the route.
From that finding, it is proposed that the supervisor already in place at Temple take a
more active role in regulating headways with the help of the control center dispatcher.
When large inbound headway gaps are observed to be coming into Temple, the
dispatcher should alert the Temple supervisor to hold the preceding bus long enough to
split the gap. This strategy should prevent most large headway gaps without having to
hold too many buses at Temple where the physical capacity is limited. By preventing
buses from leaving Temple with large headways, service reliability will be improved and
excess passenger waiting times will be reduced. In addition, this strategy has the added
benefit of adding no new resources to the Silver Line, instead, the existing resources will
be used more productively.
b) Future Resources
With relatively minimal investment, the MBTA Silver Line supervision force could cut
their field personnel requirements and concentrate headway management at the control
center. Under the proposed strategy for existing resources, the primary role of the
Temple post supervisor is to enforce terminal departure headways under the instruction of
the control center dispatcher. Through text messaging or radio contact, the dispatcher
can communicate directly with the operator and eliminate the need for the post
supervisor.
Upgrades can also be made at the control center. Automatic information processing
would give the dispatcher the ability to handle more routes (equipped with real-time
AVL) by providing exception based reports. Communication systems could also be
upgraded to allow for terminal "ring-off" bells that would alert operators of the
appropriate departure time based on the changing conditions, further reducing the need
for field personnel.
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5.4 Evaluation - Model Results
As suggested in section 3.4, a model will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
proposed supervision strategies. This model will assume the same effectiveness for both
strategies, the advantage of the higher resource version being less personnel
requirements. Due to time constraints and other obstacles, in this case an experiment was
not feasible and the model serves as the primary evaluation tool for the MBTA case
study.
5.4.1 Data
In order to model the effects of the proposed supervision strategy, AVL data from
November 28 to December 2, 2005 was analyzed. Scheduled and actual arrival and
departure times from the Temple terminal were used to create a deterministic model that
could predict the effects of the proposed supervision strategy. The model focused on the
PM peak hours of 1500-1700, where there were 21 departures from Temple outbound
each day, for a weekly total of 105 departures. Table 5-4 presents an example of the data
from Thursday, December 1, 2005.
To simulate the proposed supervision strategy, the model looked at all actual departures
from the study period. For all headways greater than the scheduled 6 minutes, the model
held the bus in front of the gap to split the gap as following the Prefol strategy. For
example, trip number 3 from Table 5-4 is before an 18 minute gap. The model would
recognize this and hold the bus for 7 minutes until its new actual departure time is 3:21
PM, giving it a 10 minute preceding headway and an 11 minute following headway.
Physical characteristics at Temple limit the terminal to a maximum of only two buses and
so the model did not hold a bus long enough to exceed this limit.
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Table 5-4 Temple PM peak departure AVL data for 12/01/05
Trip Scheduled ActualNumber
1 3:05 PM 3:10 PM
2 3:10 PM 3:11 PM
3 3:16 PM 3:14 PM
4 3:21 PM 3:32 PM
5 3:27 PM 3:32 PM
6 3:32 PM 3:41 PM
7 3:38 PM 3:44 PM
8 3:43 PM 3:46 PM
9 3:49 PM 3:55 PM
10 3:54 PM 3:58 PM
11 4:00 PM 4:01 PM
12 4:05 PM 4:06 PM
13 4:11 PM 4:20 PM
14 4:17 PM 4:24 PM
15 4:22 PM 4:25 PM
16 4:27 PM 4:27 PM
17 4:32 PM 4:32 PM
18 4:37 PM 4:37 PM
19 4:42 PM 4:47 PM
20 4:47 PM 4:50 PM
21 4:52 PM 4:57 PM
5.4.2 Results
As shown in Table 5-5, the model forecasts that more trips will operate at close to the
scheduled headway ratio when the proposed supervision strategy is in place than was
observed without the strategy, with fewer trips being bunched (headway ratio <= 0.4) or
gapped (headway ratio > 1.6).
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Table 5-5 Forecast headway ratio with proposed supervision strategy
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Similar to the Chicago Transit Authority case study, a more consistent headway ratio
leads to less excess passenger wait time as shown in Table 5-6. During the study period,
the AVL data reflected a headway coefficient of variation of 0.4, leading to excess
passenger wait times of 1.2 minutes. This represented on average 44.6% of the scheduled
expected wait time. With the proposed supervision strategy, the headway coefficient of
variation falls to 0.4, leading to an average excess passenger wait time of 0.6 minutes, or
only 21.2% of the scheduled expected waiting time. In other words, the use of the
proposed supervision strategy is forecast to halve excess passenger wait times.
Table 5-6 Forecast excess passenger wait time with proposed supervision strategy
Observed SupervisionScheduled Scenario Scenario
Mean Headway (min) 5.3 5.6 5.6
Standard Deviation 0.5 3.5 2.3
Coefficient of Variation 0.1 0.6 0.4
Expected Wait Time 2.7 3.9 3.3
Excess Wait Time 1.2 0.6
% of Schedule 44.6% 21.2%
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5.5 Summary of Case Study
This case study has shown the application of the framework presented in Chapter 3 to the
MBTA's Silver Line. By conducting a thorough assessment of the state of reliability and
the state of supervisory resources, unreliability causes can be quickly identified and a
supervision strategy developed. Using existing supervisory resources more effectively,
more consistent departure headways can be achieved at the Temple terminal during the
PM peak period. As a result, the average excess passenger waiting time is cut in half as
the headway coefficient of variation is reduced.
The lowering of the terminal departure headway variation through supervision will not
only benefit passengers waiting at Temple, but should also benefit those waiting
downstream. The effect of terminal departure performance on downstream reliability is
well documented on Route 20 and the Dudley terminal of the Silver Line as mentioned in
sections 4.5 and 5.1 respectively. As terminal departure headways become more
consistent at Temple, so should the headways downstream.
The case study has also shown that not only can current supervisory resources be used
more effectively, but personnel requirements can be reduced through minimal upgrades
in communications and shifts in responsibilities. If the dispatcher is given direct
communications with the operator, than the post supervisor position at Temple can be
eliminated as headway management moves into the control center. Furthermore,
information processing upgrades could allow the dispatcher to manage more routes.
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6 Conclusions and Key Findings
This chapter begins with an assessment of the supervision evaluation framework, and
then summarizes the key findings from its application to the CTA and the MBTA case
studies. Newly raised questions and those left unanswered will be posed pointing the
way to future research in this area.
6.1 Framework Assessment
The framework developed and applied in this thesis serves as a tool for transit agencies to
use in order to maximize the contributions of their bus supervision force. The steps in the
framework were designed to take a system-level approach in assessing supervision
resources and service reliability before developing a deployment strategy that reflected
this assessment. Once a strategy was developed, evaluation methods at both the system
and route level were employed to fine tune it.
Assessing the three major supervision resources - information, communications, and
personnel - is necessary to know the potential strengths and weaknesses of the
supervision force. These resources will act as constraints on the personnel deployment
strategy but will also point the way towards future investments that can have the most
impact on deployment and service reliability.
By assessing the state of service reliability, transit agencies will be able to prioritize the
most important tasks for supervisors (e.g. incident management, terminal departures) and
assign them accordingly. While information and communication constraints will restrict
the feasibility of some tasks, a reliability assessment will highlight the most pressing
supervision needs and can steer future resource investments accordingly.
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After taking inventory of the supervision resources and service reliability problems, a
supervision deployment strategy can be developed. This strategy will primarily aim to
allocate personnel among the control center, mobile, and post supervisor positions given
the current information and communications resources. The allocation serves to take
advantage of the inherent strengths in the current resource state while minimizing
deployment in areas of weakness. For example, after applying the framework to the
CTA, a recommendation of fewer post supervisors and more control center staff emerged
as tasks shifted to the control center.
When a supervision deployment strategy has been formed, an evaluation will be
necessary to verify if the changes have been beneficial, and to determine what changes
can be made to further improve the strategy. At the system level, this means making sure
that the right number of personnel are assigned to the right places. Mobile, post, and
control center personnel should not be overwhelmed with a large queue of tasks, nor
should they be so numerous that there is not enough work to go around. System level
reliability indicators should show improvements, and if they do not, the priority of tasks
may need adjustments or future resource investments should be looked into. An
evaluation at the route level will involve looking for improvements in service reliability
and making sure that the causes of unreliability (e.g. terminal departures) have been
addressed.
6.2 Key Findings
Several findings have come about from this research, both in terms of bus supervision
deployment, and service reliability. The following subsections will describe the most
important findings.
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6.2.1 Resource State and Personnel Deployment
The principle feature of the proposed framework is that as information and
communication systems evolve, personnel deployment strategies need to change in order
to take advantage of the increase in resources. By repositioning limited personnel
resources, changes in information and communications can be harnessed to improve
service reliability and possibly reduce personnel requirements at the same time.
The framework has shown that in a very limited resource state, personnel requirements
are extremely high since all tasks will have to be done manually. This includes service
monitoring, and incident detection and response. Certain tasks such as service restoration
prove to be very difficult when resources are so low and this prevents supervisors from
significantly improving service reliability.
As resource investments increase, information collection and sharing improves and more
tasks are able to be completed. A reliable communications system allows for an effective
control center to be established, and for the reallocation of post supervisor positions to
mobile positions and developer/analyst positions who can assist in maintaining and
developing new decision support tools. In the field, mobile supervisors are able to work
with the control center to respond to incidents as well as restore service when delay
announcements are made in a timely fashion. Fewer post supervisors are needed as
mobile supervisors are able to respond more quickly with improved incident, delay and
equipment defect detection and communications. They can continue to contribute in key
locations with heavy service levels that require constant supervision.
With advanced real-time vehicle location information, decision support tools and digital
communications, the control center will be able to take on most responsibilities, reducing
overall personnel requirements even further. Mobile supervisors will still be needed to
respond to incidents, but fewer will be required as headway management moves to the
control center. Post supervisors will manage the busiest location where they can quickly
respond to operator and equipment needs.
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6.2.2 CTA Recommendations
In its current resource state, it is recommended that the CTA shift most post supervisors
to mobile supervisors. Post supervisors have the best idea of how a route passing them is
performing, but are unable to effectively manage headways due to a lack of real-time
vehicle information and communications, nor are they able to quickly respond to
incidents. Without real-time vehicle location information, supervisors must guess the
future state of service delays and instruct operators in advance of the desired service
restoration action. Mobile supervisors can respond to incidents as well as delay
announcement, but only once Cl announces the dealy.
To improve the delay announcement process, the CTA should work with each garage to
improve the detection and announcement of hold-ins and delayed pull-outs as soon as
possible so that the street can be re-spaced effectively. Currently, garages are too slow to
report these delays to the control center, and the control center is too busy with incidents
to be able to broadcast the delays when they are received.
The biggest resource problems are a lack of real-time AVL information, and a lack of
communications capacity. This may change in the future with projects such as the Real-
Time Network pilot project described in Chapter 4. As these resources increase, a
personnel deployment shift will be necessary to take advantage of them. Further
technological improvements (primarily in the development of exception-based reporting
and automatic terminal departure alerts) should be pursued to improve service.
As real-time AVL information comes online, the control center will be able to take care
of service monitoring and restoration as well as its previous incident response task. This
will require more dispatchers to monitor service as well as communicate with field
supervisors the service restoration instructions. Once the system is developed, field
personnel requirements should shift from post supervisors to mobile supervisors as
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control will be able to deploy supervisors more quickly for incident response and service
restoration, and fewer post supervisors will be needed for service monitoring.
If improved communications also comes online, then the control center will be able to
take full responsibility for service management and incident response, reducing the need
for field supervisors while increasing the need for system support and service
management-oriented technically comfortable personnel. Field personnel who are no
longer tasked with service management can be reassigned to assist in maintaining and
developing decision support tools and response standards, drawing on their extensive
experience from being in the field.
6.2.3 Terminal Departures
The case studies on Route 20 and the Silver Line have shown how bus service reliability
is able to dramatically improve once bus bunching and headway gaps are managed from
the terminals. The effects of the terminal discipline are felt downstream as more buses
are able to maintain the scheduled headway after leaving the terminal with the scheduled
headway.
It is not cost-effective to place a supervisor at each terminal in order to enforce the
scheduled headway and to space the terminal when delays arise. Therefore, it is
recommended that the real-time AVL project at the CTA continue its development
towards automatic headway monitoring and exception based reporting to control center
staff. If any delays are present in the route or network, the automated service
management system needs to be able to give instructions directly to operators so that they
can adjust their departure times and headways as needed.
A culture of schedule and headway adherence must also be promoted at the operator and
supervisory level for service reliability to improve substantially. Bus operators already
know their schedule but there is still variability in schedule adherence despite this
information. Providing headway information without instilling a culture of headway
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adherence will not help solve the reliability problem. Operators need to know that
schedule and headway adherence is important and that they need to make every effort
possible to be compliant. Transit agencies could foster this culture in a variety of ways,
including strict discipline for non-compliance, or rewards for adhering to
schedule/headway. The data is readily available now in the form of archived AVL data,
and should be used more intensively as a performance reporting tool.
6.2.4 Headway Degradation
Even with good terminal departure performance, service reliability will degrade along a
bus route as shown in the case studies. Traffic variability, signal lights, and dwell time
variations will continue to take their toll on service reliability despite the best supervision
efforts. To help combat this effect and preserve the efforts made at the terminal,
conditional signal priority should be aggressively pursued in combination with far-side
bus stops. This investment can help lower overall travel times as well as travel time
variability. Smart card use should be promoted to minimize dwell time variability. With
these steps in place, bus supervision will be in a better position to promote bus service
reliability.
As technology continues to advance, operators should be given their headway
information directly in vehicle. This way they can continuously adjust their speed and
spacing in order to maintain the scheduled headway.
6.2.5 Power of Technology
The case studies in this thesis have shown the potential impacts of real-time AVL
information and improved communications on bus supervision and bus service reliability.
Having access to real-time AVL information, supervisors are able to respond more
quickly, execute operations control strategies more effectively and are able to spend less
time manually monitoring service. Through improved communications, dispatchers are
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able to monitor service, while calling on field supervisors to execute operations control
strategies and respond to incidents.
6.2.6 Move towards Automation
As information and communications technology continues to evolve, a move towards
automation should take place. Real-time AVL information needs to be automatically
processed to give dispatchers actionable exception based reported information, such as
the locations of bus bunching, headways gaps, and incidents. This way, service
management improves and the personnel requirements to monitor service may be
reduced. In addition, headway and schedule adherence information should be
automatically communicated directly to operators in real-time. This will place terminal
spacing and headway maintenance tasks in the hands of operators and should free up field
supervisors to perform tasks that require personnel, such as repairs, incident response,
and customer service.
With automatic information processing and sharing in place, standardized responses will
need to be developed in tandem so that dispatchers, supervisors, and operators will know
what is expected of them in any given situation. These responses should be developed
from the experience of field supervisors so that they provide optimal results and are
practical to implement.
6.3 Future Research
Much of this thesis focused on the development and application of a framework that
could be used to analyze service reliability and supervision in order to develop improved
supervision deployment strategies. Future work could be completed in applying this
framework to other routes or perhaps other agencies to get feedback on its applicability.
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While the proposed framework offered suggestions on evaluating different supervision
deployment strategies, more work should be done in the development of evaluation tools.
These tools could be used to measure supervisor work load, productivity, and
effectiveness as well as overall service reliability changes. As communication,
information, and personnel resources change, a set of tools are needed to evaluate the
current supervision strategy and to help guide the development of new strategies.
Further research could also be done on operator reaction to new technologies such as
schedule/headway feedback and text messaging. If the technological improvements
suggested here are to help reduce personnel requirements, positive operator response to
these improvements needs to be documented.
With regard to supervision evaluation, the Monte Carlo simulation used on Route 20
could be further developed into a tool capable of simulating other routes with similar
precision. The development of such a tool would give transit agencies the ability to
simulate changes to scheduling, travel times, or other changes as well as supervision
before actual implementation.
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